Synthesising arguments motivate changes to the conceptual tools, theoretical structure, and evaluatory framework employed in a given scientific domain. Recently, a broad coalition of researchers has put forward a synthes...Synthesising arguments motivate changes to the conceptual tools, theoretical structure, and evaluatory framework employed in a given scientific domain. Recently, a broad coalition of researchers has put forward a synthesising argument in favour of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ('EES'). Often this synthesising argument is evaluated using a virtue-based approach, which construes the EES as a wholesale alternative to prevailing practice. Here I argue this virtue-based approach is not fit for purpose. Taking the central concept of niche construction as a case study, I show that an agenda-based approach better captures the pragmatic and epistemological goals of the EES synthesising argument and diagnoses areas of empirical disagreement with prevailing practice.
This paper examines the complex research landscape of contemporary suicidology from a philosophy of science perspective. I begin by unpacking the methods, concepts, and assumptions of some of the prominent approaches to...This paper examines the complex research landscape of contemporary suicidology from a philosophy of science perspective. I begin by unpacking the methods, concepts, and assumptions of some of the prominent approaches to studying suicide causation, including psychological autopsy studies, epidemiological studies, biological studies, and qualitative studies. I then analyze the different ways these approaches partition the causes of suicide, with particular emphasis on the ways they conceptualize the domain of mental disorder. I argue that these different ways of partitioning the causal space and conceptualizing mental disorder result in incommensurabilities between the approaches. These incommensurabilities restrict the degrees to which the different approaches can be integrated, thus lending support to explanatory pluralism in the study of suicide causation. They also shed light on some of the philosophical underpinnings of the disagreement between mainstream suicidology and the emerging area of critical suicidology.
In this article I critically evaluate the thesis that DNA is an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. I shall critically analyse different versions of the latter thesis by taking into consideration concrete deve...In this article I critically evaluate the thesis that DNA is an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. I shall critically analyse different versions of the latter thesis by taking into consideration concrete developmental cases. I shall argue that DNA is neither a developmental determinant nor an ontologically distinctive developmental cause. Instead, I shall argue that mechanistic analysis shows that DNA's causal role in development depends on the higher robustness of the developmental processes in which it exerts its causal capacities. The focus on process and developmental system implies a metaphysical shift: rather than attributing to DNA molecules biochemically unique properties, I suggest that it might be better to think about DNA's causal role in development in terms of the causal capacities that DNA molecules manifest in a rich developmental milieu. I shall also suggest that my position is distinct both from the view advocating the instrumental primacy of DNA-centric biology and developmental constructionism. It is different from the former because it provides a substantial answer to the question of what makes DNA causally central in developmental processes. Finally, I argue that evolutionary considerations pose an important challenge to developmental constructionism.
Despite August Krogh's famous admonition that a 'convenient' organism exists for every biological problem, we argue that appeals to 'convenience' are not sufficient to capture reasoning about organism choice. Instead, we...Despite August Krogh's famous admonition that a 'convenient' organism exists for every biological problem, we argue that appeals to 'convenience' are not sufficient to capture reasoning about organism choice. Instead, we offer a detailed analysis based on empirical data and philosophical arguments for a working set of twenty criteria that interact with each other in the highly contextualized judgements that biologists make about organism choice. We propose to think of these decisions as a form of 'differential analysis' where researchers weigh multiple criteria for organismal choice against each other, and often utilize multidimensional refinement processes to finalize their choices. The specific details of any one case make it difficult to draw generalizations or to abstract away from specific research situations. However, this analysis of criteria for organismal choice and how these are related in practice allows us to reflect more generally on what makes a particular organism useful or 'good.'
Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant's various re...Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant's various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated.
In the months before and after the final surrender of Nazi Germany on 8 May 1945, British aviation medicine specialists were sent to the European continent to learn the progress that German aviation medicine had made sin...In the months before and after the final surrender of Nazi Germany on 8 May 1945, British aviation medicine specialists were sent to the European continent to learn the progress that German aviation medicine had made since September 1939. For the medical officers at the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine at Farnborough in Hampshire, the dilemma over whether the medical data from the Nazi aviation medicine experiments at Dachau concentration camp should be exploited presented profound moral and ethical problems. Their deliberations paralleled those of the 1945-46 Nuremberg Trial, which revealed the crimes that were committed under the Nazi regime. At the same time, the British medical establishment debated the morality of publishing the Nazi medical research to serve humanity. This article shows that on the basis of British wartime and post-war research, and determinations that were made by the British Advisory Committee for the Investigation of German Medical War Crimes, by 1948 the RAF IAM had essentially rejected the results of the Nazi aviation medicine experiments on scientific and ethical grounds.
Behaviour is a widespread object of research in biology, yet it is often left undefined, and the variety of existing definitions have not led to a consensus. We argue that the fundamental problem in defining behaviour ha...Behaviour is a widespread object of research in biology, yet it is often left undefined, and the variety of existing definitions have not led to a consensus. We argue that the fundamental problem in defining behaviour has been the assumption that the concept must be categorical: either a phenomenon is a behaviour or it is not. We propose instead that 'behaviour' is best understood as a spectrum concept. We have identified three major characteristics of phenomena which, we argue, fuel the intuitions of biologists regarding the classification of cases as behaviour. All are related to the mechanistic explanations put forth to account for the phenomena, and are (i) the complexity of the mechanism, (ii) the stability of the constitutive entities, and (iii) the quantity and significance of the inputs to the underlying mechanism. We illustrate this new conceptualisation through a three-dimensional behaviour-space which highlights the apparently different conceptualizations of behaviour attributed to humans, animals and plants, showing that they, in fact, all partake of a unified, malleable understanding of a single concept.
Does natural selection tend to maximise something? Does it produce individuals who act as if they maximised something? These questions have long occupied evolutionary theorists, and have proven especially tricky in the c...Does natural selection tend to maximise something? Does it produce individuals who act as if they maximised something? These questions have long occupied evolutionary theorists, and have proven especially tricky in the case of social evolution, which is known for leading to apparently suboptimal states. This paper investigates recent results about maximising analogies - especially regarding whether individuals should be considered as if they maximised their inclusive fitness - and compares the fruitfulness of global and local approaches. I assess Okasha & Martens's recent local approach to the individual-as-maximising-agent analogy and its robustness with respect to interactive situations. I then defend the relative merits of a comparable global approach, arguing that it is conceptually on a par and heuristically advantageous.
A nonmathematical exposition of the current status of the formal darwinism project is presented, linking it to the fundamental theorem of natural selection, which is regarded as Fisher's own 'formal darwinism project'. T...A nonmathematical exposition of the current status of the formal darwinism project is presented, linking it to the fundamental theorem of natural selection, which is regarded as Fisher's own 'formal darwinism project'. The purpose is to found organism-level thinking about design and adaptation, in short Darwinism, on what is known about the mechanics of genetic inheritance, in short Mendelism, and the project is to do so in as general a biological setting as possible. This view also makes sense of the name 'fundamental theorem of natural selection'.
In this paper, I contrast two mathematically equivalent ways of modeling the evolution of altruism, namely the classical inclusive fitness approach and a more recent, "direct fitness" approach. Though both are usually co...In this paper, I contrast two mathematically equivalent ways of modeling the evolution of altruism, namely the classical inclusive fitness approach and a more recent, "direct fitness" approach. Though both are usually considered by evolutionists as mere different ways of representing the same causal process (i.e. that of kin selection), I argue that this consensus is misleading, for there is a fundamental ambiguity concerning the causal interpretation of the DF approach. Drawing on an analogy between the structure of inclusive fitness theory and that of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, 1972), I show that only the inclusive fitness framework can provide us with a proper, and unambiguous causal partition of the relevant variables involved in the evolution of altruism.
In this paper we aim to give an analysis and cognitive rationalization of a common practice or strategy of modeling in systems biology known as a middle-out modeling strategy. The strategy in the cases we look at is faci...In this paper we aim to give an analysis and cognitive rationalization of a common practice or strategy of modeling in systems biology known as a middle-out modeling strategy. The strategy in the cases we look at is facilitated through the construction of what can be called mesoscopic models. Many models built in computational systems biology are mesoscopic (midsize) in scale. Such models lack the sufficient fidelity to serve as robust predictors of the behaviors of complex biological systems, one of the signature goals of the field. This puts some pressure on the field to provide reasons for why and how these practices are warranted despite not meeting the stated goals of the field. Using the results of ethnographic study of problem-solving practices in systems biology, we aim to examine the middle-out strategy and mesoscopic modeling in detail and to show that these practices are rational responses to complex problem solving tasks on cognitive grounds in particular. However making this claim requires us to update the standard notion of bounded rationality to take account of how human cognition is coupled to computation in these contexts. Our account fleshes out the idea that has been raised by some philosophers on the "hybrid" nature of computational modeling and simulation. What we call "coupling" both extends modelers' capacities to handle complex systems, but also produces various cognitive and computational constraints which need to be taken into account in any computational problem solving strategy seeking to maintain insight and control over the models produced.
The theme of this paper is that Fisher's "Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection" has various deficiencies as a quantification of the effect of natural selection in a Mendelian population which are not shared by a new...The theme of this paper is that Fisher's "Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection" has various deficiencies as a quantification of the effect of natural selection in a Mendelian population which are not shared by a new different theorem described in this paper. The deficiencies in Fisher's theorem are listed in this paper. The new theorem focuses on the implications of changes in gene frequencies under natural selection and not, as does the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, on changes in mean population fitness. Whereas the algebra in the new theorem corresponds in places to that in the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, the approach, perspective and conclusion of the new theorem are different from those of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection.
Cancer screening is the subject of much debate; while screening has the potential to save lives by identifying and treating cancers in early stages, it is also the case that not all cancers cause symptoms, and the diagno...Cancer screening is the subject of much debate; while screening has the potential to save lives by identifying and treating cancers in early stages, it is also the case that not all cancers cause symptoms, and the diagnosis of these cancers can lead to unnecessary treatments and subsequent side-effects and complications. This paper explores the relationships between epistemic risks in cancer diagnosis and screening, the social organization of medical research and practice, and policy making; it does this by examining 2018 recommendations by the United States Preventative Services Task Force that patients make individualized, autonomy-based decisions about cancer screening on the basis of discussions with their physicians. While the paper focuses on prostate cancer screening, the issues that it raises are relevant to other cancer screening programs, especially breast cancer. The paper argues that prostate cancer screening-and, more generally, the process of risk assessment for prostate cancer-is pervaded by epistemic risks that reflect value judgments and that the pervasiveness of these epistemic risks creates significant and under-explored difficulties for physician-patient communication and the achievement of autonomous patient decision making.
In this paper I propose a new account of living natural products in Kant's physical geography. I argue that Kant adopts Buffon's twofold conception of natural history, which consists of a general theory of nature as a ph...In this paper I propose a new account of living natural products in Kant's physical geography. I argue that Kant adopts Buffon's twofold conception of natural history, which consists of a general theory of nature as a physical nexus of causes and a particular account of living natural products in the setting of the earth. Yet in contrast to Buffon, who placed the two parts of natural history on equal epistemic footing, Kant's physical geography can be understood as a second, pragmatic level of inquiry that stands under the formal conditions of nature outlined in Universal Natural History. On the higher, formal level, natural history provides a physical account of time and space as an expanding causal sequence. On the lower, pragmatic level, physical geography provides a causal account of particular natural products as developing within a specific place. I argue that this two-tiered account not only clarifies the relation between metaphysics and experience in Kant's pre-critical philosophy, it also sheds light on the continuity between the method of physical geography and the systematisation of nature presented in the critical philosophy.
In a new and interesting book entitled Medical Nihilism (2018), Jacob Stegenga attempts to convince us that modern medical therapies are less effective than we think. Given the heterogeneity of hypotheses in medicine and...In a new and interesting book entitled Medical Nihilism (2018), Jacob Stegenga attempts to convince us that modern medical therapies are less effective than we think. Given the heterogeneity of hypotheses in medicine and the evidence for or against them, I argue that such a decontextualised critique cannot be made unless substantially weakened. Instead, I put forward an alternative, more nuanced and defensible epistemic view of medicine. According to this view, evaluating medical evidence requires analysis of both the methods of research e.g. randomised controlled trial (RCT), and context-specific information. This is because the way a trial (even an RCT) is conducted e.g. the population recruited and how it is intervened on, will vary and will have significant effects on the likelihood of a positive outcome. Moreover, the relationship between the positive outcome of a trial and the actual effectiveness of an intervention (the trial validity) will depend on these context specific factors. I argue for this position against nihilism by showing how each of Stegenga's individual claims about medical trials (trials are biased in favour of positive outcomes etc) can be questioned by taking the context into consideration.
I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent dist...I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.
I distinguish two roles for a fitness concept in the context of explaining cumulative adaptive evolution: fitness as a predictor of gene frequency change, and fitness as a criterion for phenotypic improvement. Critics of...I distinguish two roles for a fitness concept in the context of explaining cumulative adaptive evolution: fitness as a predictor of gene frequency change, and fitness as a criterion for phenotypic improvement. Critics of inclusive fitness argue, correctly, that it is not an ideal fitness concept for the purpose of predicting gene-frequency change, since it relies on assumptions about the causal structure of social interaction that are unlikely to be exactly true in real populations, and that hold as approximations only given a specific type of weak selection. However, Hamilton took this type of weak selection, on independent grounds, to be responsible for cumulative assembly of complex adaptations. In this special context, I argue that inclusive fitness is distinctively valuable as a criterion for improvement and a standard for optimality. Yet to call inclusive fitness a criterion for improvement and a standard for optimality is not to make any claim about the frequency with which inclusive fitness optimization actually occurs in nature. This is an empirical question that cannot be settled by theory alone. I close with some reflections on the place of inclusive fitness in the long running clash between 'causalist' and 'statisticalist' conceptions of fitness.