In this paper, I revisit the development of the repression model of genetic regulation in the lac operon to challenge a common application of a conceptual framework in the history of biology. I take Allen's (1978) accoun...In this paper, I revisit the development of the repression model of genetic regulation in the lac operon to challenge a common application of a conceptual framework in the history of biology. I take Allen's (1978) account of the changes in the life sciences during the early and mid-twentieth century as an example of a common application of a framework based on the dichotomy between a mechanistic, or reductionist, approach to science and a holistic one. From this conceptual framework, Allen infers two general claims about the process of science and its goals: (1) that "mechanistic materialism" has often presented a more practical way to begin the study of complex phenomena in the life sciences, and (2) that the approach described as "holistic materialism" provides a more complete or accurate description of the natural world. The development of the lac operon model does not fit Allen's generalizations about scientific developments, and it can be used to cast some doubt on the scope of application of that conceptual framework. I argue that a better framework to interpret particular episodes in the history of molecular biology is to consider the ways in which biologists prioritize and track different aspects of the phenomena under study, rather than to focus on whether certain scientific practices are best described as developing from mechanistic to more holistic approaches. I end with some implications for the historiography of science by considering the appropriateness of different conceptual frameworks for different grains of resolution in the history of biology.
In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on p...In the last few years, the lack of a unitary notion of gene across biological sciences has troubled the philosophy of biology community. However, the debate on this concept has remained largely historical or focused on particular cases presented by the scientific empirical advancements. Moreover, in the literature there are no explicit and reasonable arguments about why a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene is needed. In our paper, we claim that a philosophical clarification of the concept of gene does not contribute to biology. Unlike the question, for example, "What is a biological function?", we argue that the question "What is a gene?" could be answered by means of empirical research, in the sense that biologists' labour is enough to shed light on it.
We introduce here evoText, a new tool for automated analysis of the literature in the biological sciences. evoText contains a database of hundreds of thousands of journal articles and an array of analysis tools for gener...We introduce here evoText, a new tool for automated analysis of the literature in the biological sciences. evoText contains a database of hundreds of thousands of journal articles and an array of analysis tools for generating quantitative data on the nature and history of life science, especially ecology and evolutionary biology. This article describes the features of evoText, presents a variety of examples of the kinds of analyses that evoText can run, and offers a brief tutorial describing how to use it.
This paper analyses the structure of evolutionary theory as a quasi-Newtonian theory and the need to establish a Zero-Cause Law. Several authors have postulated that the special character of drift is because it is the de...This paper analyses the structure of evolutionary theory as a quasi-Newtonian theory and the need to establish a Zero-Cause Law. Several authors have postulated that the special character of drift is because it is the default behaviour or Zero-Cause Law of evolutionary systems, where change and not stasis is the normal state of them. For these authors, drift would be a Zero-Cause Law, the default behaviour and therefore a constituent assumption impossible to change without changing the system. I defend that drift's causal and explanatory power prevents it from being considered as a Zero-Cause Law. Instead, I propose that the default behaviour of evolutionary systems is what I call the Principle of Stasis, which posits that an evolutionary system where there is no selection, drift, mutation, migration, etc., and therefore no difference-maker, will not undergo any change (it will remain in stasis).
This article uses the concept of "the pollen of metaphor" to discuss three forms of non-human animal containment in the eighteenth century: François Huber's Leaf or Book Hive bee box first described in his Nouvelles Obse...This article uses the concept of "the pollen of metaphor" to discuss three forms of non-human animal containment in the eighteenth century: François Huber's Leaf or Book Hive bee box first described in his Nouvelles Observations sur les Abeilles (1792, English translation 1806), Sarah Trimmer's bird cages in her didactic children's book, Fabulous Histories; Or, The Story of the Robins (1786), and a mouse trap in Anna Letitia Barbauld's 1773 poem, "The Mouse's Petition, found in the trap where he had been confined all night by Dr. Priestley, for the sake of making experiments with different kinds of air." All three works highlight the eighteenth-century art of observation. The inherent commitment to relationships in the observation process suggests that interpreting ocular evidence involves "plausible relations," metaphor and/or "productive analogy." The article teases out subtle differences between the ways that each author uses containments and concludes that while Huber seeks to circumscribe non-human animal behavior within the bounds of 'reasonable' animal husbandry to better serve human needs, Trimmer goes further to connect 'appropriate' non-human animal containment to moral strictures governing humans. Barbauld's intervention using a literate, speaking animal subject confronts such moral governance to argue for equal rights based on principles of true equality rather than what is observed to be 'reasonable' and/or 'moral.'
Neven Sesardic has recently defended his arguments in favour of racial naturalism-the view that race is a valid biological category-in response to my criticism of his work. While Sesardic claims that a strong version of...Neven Sesardic has recently defended his arguments in favour of racial naturalism-the view that race is a valid biological category-in response to my criticism of his work. While Sesardic claims that a strong version of racial naturalism can survive critique, he has in fact weakened his position considerably. He concedes that conventional racial taxonomy is arbitrary and he no longer identifies 'races' as human subspecies. Sesardic now relies almost entirely on Theodosius Dobzhansky's notion of race-as-population. This weak approach to 'race'-according to which all genetic difference between populations is 'racial' and 'the races' are simply the populations we choose to call races-survived its early critiques. As it is being mobilised to support racial naturalism once more, we need to continue the debate about whether we should weaken the concept of race to mean 'population', or abandon it as a failed biological category. I argue that Sesardic's case for racial naturalism is only supported by his continued mischaracterisation of anti-realism about biological race and his appeal to Dobzhansky's authority. Rather than deflating the meaning of 'race', it should be eliminated from our biological ontology.
This paper concerns the concept of normal development, and how it is enacted in experimental procedures. To that end, I use an historical case study to assess the three ways in which normal development is and has been pr...This paper concerns the concept of normal development, and how it is enacted in experimental procedures. To that end, I use an historical case study to assess the three ways in which normal development is and has been produced, used, and interpreted in the practice of experimental biology. I argue that each of these approaches involves different processes of abstraction, which manage biological variation differently. I then document the way in which Edmund Beecher Wilson, a key contributor to late-nineteenth century experimental embryology, approached the study of normal development and show that his work does not fit any of the three established categories in the taxonomy. On the basis of this new case study, I present a new interpretation of normal development as a methodological norm which operates as a technical condition in various experimental systems. I close by suggesting the questions, and ways of investigating developmental biology, that are opened up by this perspective.
The collection of essays comes under the heading of two catchwords: instruments and media. This Afterword looks at their interaction and roles in exploring the characteristics of living beings throughout history, especia...The collection of essays comes under the heading of two catchwords: instruments and media. This Afterword looks at their interaction and roles in exploring the characteristics of living beings throughout history, especially their melding and gliding into each other. Before turning to the papers, I will make some more general remarks on instruments and media in scientific, and in particular, biological research.
Concerned with the study of viruses and the diseases they cause, virology is now a well-established scientific discipline. Whereas aspects of its history from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century have often b...Concerned with the study of viruses and the diseases they cause, virology is now a well-established scientific discipline. Whereas aspects of its history from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century have often been recounted through a number of detailed case studies, few general discussions of the historiography of virology have been offered. Looking at the ways in which the history of virology has been told, this article examines a number of debates among scientists and historians of biology and show how they are based on a different understanding of notions such as "discipline", of processes such as "scientific discovery" as well as on distinct views about what the history of science is and how it should be written (the opposition between "longue durée" and "micro-history" or between history of "concepts" versus "experimental methods"). The analysis provided here also suggests that a richer historiography of virology will require looking at the variations over time of the relations between conceptual, technological, and institutional factors that fostered its development at the intersection of several other scientific fields in the life sciences.
Experimental ecologists often invoke trade-offs to describe the constraints they encounter when choosing between alternative experimental designs, such as between laboratory, field, and natural experiments. In making the...Experimental ecologists often invoke trade-offs to describe the constraints they encounter when choosing between alternative experimental designs, such as between laboratory, field, and natural experiments. In making these claims, they tend to rely on Richard Levins' analysis of trade-offs in theoretical model-building. But does Levins' framework apply to experiments? In this paper, I focus this question on one desideratum widely invoked in the modelling literature: generality. Using the case of generality, I assess whether Levins-style treatments of modelling provide workable resources for assessing trade-offs in experimental design. I argue that, of four strategies modellers employ to increase generality, only one may be unproblematically applied to experimental design. Furthermore, modelling desiderata do not have obvious correlates in experimental design, and when we define these desiderata in a way that seem consistent with ecologists' usage, the trade-off framework falls apart. I conclude that a Levins-inspired framework for modelling does not provide the content for a similar approach to experimental practice; this does not, however, mean that it cannot provide the form.
Throughout the 20th century, human genetics research was driven by the identification of new variants. As pioneering geneticist William Bateson put it, novel variants were "exceptions" to "treasure". With the rise of hum...Throughout the 20th century, human genetics research was driven by the identification of new variants. As pioneering geneticist William Bateson put it, novel variants were "exceptions" to "treasure". With the rise of human chromosomal analysis in the postwar period, the identification of genetic variants became increasingly significant to clinical and prenatal diagnosis. Human geneticists had long sought a broader sampling of human genetic variation, from a largely "normal" population. The expansion of prenatal diagnosis in the late 20th century offered a new resource for identifying novel genetic variants. In the prenatal diagnostic setting however, many of the exceptions to be treasured were of uncertain clinical significance, which raised anxiety among parents. In the early 1990s, providers reported that specific uncertain results from chorionic villus sampling (CVS) facilitated prenatal diagnoses that were not previously possible. Based on this, some prenatal diagnostic providers began to embrace uncertainty, when properly managed to reduce anxiety, rather than prevent it. The potential to produce uncertainty in prenatal diagnosis grew with whole genome microarray in the 2000s. Rather than outcomes to avoid, or accept as inevitable, providers presented uncertain results as starting points for research to improve the scope prenatal diagnosis, and bring future certainty.
Important roles in origin of life (OL) scenarios have been and still are attributed to viruses. Yet the strict dependence of viruses on cells for their multiplication has been widely acknowledged since the first decades...Important roles in origin of life (OL) scenarios have been and still are attributed to viruses. Yet the strict dependence of viruses on cells for their multiplication has been widely acknowledged since the first decades of the 20th century. How could viruses play critical roles in the OL if life relies on cellular organization and if viruses are defined as parasites of cells? In other words, how could viruses play a role in the emergence of cellular life if the existence of cells is a prerequisite for the existence of viruses? This paper investigates this issue and describes past and current OL scenarios conferring viruses with important roles, thereby completing the work of historian of science and physician Scott Podolsky who identified three major roles of viruses in past OL scenarios. Some objections raised by present OL scenarios conferring viruses with an important role are discussed. I argue that disagreements concerning the roles of viruses in OL scenarios stem from the different concepts of life and of virus scientists defend. Investigating the roles of viruses in OL scenarios not only helps identifying different ways to define life in the context of OL theorizing. It also offers the opportunity to better understand how viruses could be conceptualized. The relevance of the replication-first versus metabolism-first dichotomy in OL theorizing is briefly discussed.
Embryos have different meanings for different people and in different contexts. Seen under the microscope, the biological embryo starts out as one cell and then becomes a bunch of cells. Gradually these divide and differ...Embryos have different meanings for different people and in different contexts. Seen under the microscope, the biological embryo starts out as one cell and then becomes a bunch of cells. Gradually these divide and differentiate to make up the embryo, which in humans becomes a fetus at eight weeks, and then eventually a baby. At least, that happens in those cases that carry through normally and successfully. Yet a popular public perception imagines the embryo as already a little person in the very earliest stages of development, as if it were predictably to become an adult. In actuality, cells can combine, pull apart, and recombine in a variety of ways and still produce embryos, whereas most embryos never develop into adults at all. Biological embryos and popular imaginations of embryos diverge. This paper looks at some of the historical reasons for and social implications of that divergence.
Three major discoveries have recently profoundly modified our perception of the viral world: molecular ecologists have shown that viral particles are more abundant than cells in natural environments; structural biologist...Three major discoveries have recently profoundly modified our perception of the viral world: molecular ecologists have shown that viral particles are more abundant than cells in natural environments; structural biologists have shown that some viruses from the three domains of life, Bacteria, Eukarya and Archaea, are evolutionarily related, and microbiologists have discovered giant viruses that rival with cells in terms of size and gene content. I discuss here the scientific and philosophical impact of these discoveries on the debates over the definition, nature (living or not), and origin of viruses. I suggest that viruses have often been considered non-living, because they are traditionally assimilated to their virions. However, the term virus describes a biological process and should integrate all aspects of the viral reproduction cycle. It is especially important to focus on the intracellular part of this cycle, the virocell, when viral information is actively expressed and reproduced, allowing the emergence of new viral genes. The virocell concept theoretically removes roadblocks that prevent defining viruses as living organisms. However, defining a "living organism" remains challenging, as indicated by the case of organelles that evolved from intracellular bacteria. To bypass this problem, I suggest considering that all biological entities that actively participate in the process of life are living.
The question what constitutes organic life might be answered variously. This special issue explores how the rendering of life throughout the history of biology has been shaped by various instruments and media. While ackn...The question what constitutes organic life might be answered variously. This special issue explores how the rendering of life throughout the history of biology has been shaped by various instruments and media. While acknowledging the significance of the theoretical and social scenes of inquiry in which specific tools and techniques develop, and which delimit epistemic possibilities for making sense of life, the issue draws attention to material practices and instrumental mediations in experimental studies of life. Although it might seem self-evident that biology takes as its object of inquiry living organisms, it is productive to regard its subject matter as organic media rather than discrete organisms. The papers gathered in this issue show the rich potential for the critical study of how organic life has been constituted through the tools used to mediate its study.