We use language to communicate our thoughts. But is language merely the expression of thoughts, which are themselves produced by other, nonlinguistic parts of our minds? Or does language play a more transformative role i...We use language to communicate our thoughts. But is language merely the expression of thoughts, which are themselves produced by other, nonlinguistic parts of our minds? Or does language play a more transformative role in human cognition, allowing us to have thoughts that we otherwise could (or would) not have? Recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science have reinvigorated this old question. We argue that language may hold the key to the emergence of both more general AI systems and central aspects of human intelligence. We highlight two related properties of language that make it such a powerful tool for developing domain-general abilities. First, language offers compact representations that make it easier to represent and reason about many abstract concepts (e.g., exact numerosity). Second, these compressed representations are the iterated output of collective minds. In learning a language, we learn a treasure trove of culturally evolved abstractions. Taken together, these properties mean that a sufficiently powerful learning system exposed to language-whether biological or artificial-learns a compressed model of the world, reverse engineering many of the conceptual and causal structures that support human (and human-like) thought.
Researchers who employ online data collection from human subjects currently face a conundrum: It is both essential to how behavioral science functions and threatened by low-quality data. It is often assumed that random,...Researchers who employ online data collection from human subjects currently face a conundrum: It is both essential to how behavioral science functions and threatened by low-quality data. It is often assumed that random, inconsistent, and otherwise incomprehensible data in online surveys comes mainly from bots. Despite this assumption, few studies have directly examined where problematic data comes from, even though identifying the source has important implications for creating the right solutions. We examined this issue on several popular participant-recruitment platforms, including Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and Lucid. Across four studies spanning 5 years using multiple methods, we here provide evidence that most of the data-quality problems affecting online research using online panels can be tied to fraudulent users from outside of the United States-not bots. We identify many of the telltale signs that humans leave behind and describe the most effective ways of blocking problematic human responses to address the online data-quality problem.
This article pulls together diverse published findings on computer-mediated communication (CMC) to test the hypothesis that it reduces psychological engagement and impact compared with face-to-face (FTF) interactions. Al...This article pulls together diverse published findings on computer-mediated communication (CMC) to test the hypothesis that it reduces psychological engagement and impact compared with face-to-face (FTF) interactions. Although gaps and questions remain, the evidence mostly confirms reduced engagement and impact. Compared with FTF interactions, CMC elicits less positive emotion, with mixed results for negative emotions. Physiological arousal is often lower. Relationships, trust, and group cohesion develop more slowly (although perhaps eventually reaching the same levels). Information processing is reduced. Inhibitions are also reduced, leading to greater willingness to criticize, to bring up alternate perspectives and suggestions, and to neglect to respond. The disinhibition may improve participation by shy persons. Group performance and group decision-making are often impaired, although some studies found no difference. Teaching and learning go less well. Impact and engagement lose more with asynchronous than synchronous CMC. FTF interactions boost well-being compared with not interacting, but CMC is in between. When CMC augments FTF relationships, there may be benefits, but when it replaces them, there are psychological costs. Technology has enabled marvelous advances in long-distance communication, but there is still no fully satisfactory substitute for actually being together in person.
Since the early 20th century, an emphasis on the causal power of situations in social psychology has fostered the view that the self is an empty vessel filled by the contents of the situation. We label this the "empty-se...Since the early 20th century, an emphasis on the causal power of situations in social psychology has fostered the view that the self is an empty vessel filled by the contents of the situation. We label this the "empty-self metaphor," with incarnations including situationism and elements of theories of self-presentation, self-perception, social identity, the dramaturgical movement, and others. The persistence of this metatheoretical assumption has led to an underappreciation of an enduring, unique self and to the development of contemporary paradigms (e.g., social priming and embodied cognition) that have hinged on the implicit premise that the self is empty or passive. The self is not empty, of course, and new preliminary evidence we have collected indicates that research predicated on the empty-self metaphor is far less likely to replicate. Although we emphasize that the power of the situation has yielded important theoretical and practical insights, we propose that the field would be strengthened by better accounting for the chronic, dispositional motivations that emanate from an enduring self. We offer suggestions-both theoretical and methodological-that can help social psychologists achieve this goal.
Decades of psychological research have led to a better understanding of the factors that influence people's causal explanations of inequalities, such as the racial wealth gap. But our understanding of the psychology of i...Decades of psychological research have led to a better understanding of the factors that influence people's causal explanations of inequalities, such as the racial wealth gap. But our understanding of the psychology of inequality remains limited because this research has largely focused on causal and retrospective judgments. In this article, we argue that two distinctions are valuable for clarifying judgments of responsibility for inequality: the moral-causal distinction and the retrospective-prospective distinction. The moral-causal distinction differentiates judgments of agents' blameworthiness and obligation (moral) from judgments of their contribution to an outcome (causal). The retrospective-prospective distinction differentiates judgments about the agents, actions, and conditions that led to historical or present inequalities (retrospective) from judgments about what agents can or should do to remedy existing inequalities and prevent them in the future (prospective). We summarize existing research on how sociocultural, emotional, motivational, and cognitive factors affect the four categories of judgments defined by this framework. In doing so, we identify important gaps and highlight directions for future research that will allow us to better explain, predict, and shape judgments relating to inequality.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jan · PMID 41129562
·
Full text
Many effective psychological interventions change maladaptive interpretations of oneself or of one's context by offering more adaptive narratives, which are associated with desirable responses and outcomes. Psychological...Many effective psychological interventions change maladaptive interpretations of oneself or of one's context by offering more adaptive narratives, which are associated with desirable responses and outcomes. Psychologically wise interventions from the social-psychological tradition have used this approach to great effect in improving important outcomes across a variety of life domains-including, but not limited to, academic performance, physical and mental health, relationships, organizational culture, and civic behavior. Although these psychologically wise interventions target people's narratives, they do not focus on teaching effective strategies for pursuing valued goals-let alone a sustained mental habit of considering strategies that can make goal pursuit generally more effective. How might we better support and maintain adaptive narratives that psychologically wise interventions offer, especially in goal-directed, effective, and generalizable ways? I propose a complementary approach: guiding people to ask and answer strategic questions. These are questions that can elicit strategy generation, access, and use. As I explain, asking and answering strategic questions can elicit adaptive appraisals and responses to adversity. Importantly, people can learn an orientation toward self-prompting strategic questions. Understanding and intervening on strategic questioning and answering offers new frontiers for research and practice.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jan · PMID 41129548
·
Full text
Becoming aware of previously unrecognized aspects of one's psychological and behavioral challenges is one of the central mechanisms of positive psychotherapeutic change. Yet the specific neurocognitive processes that und...Becoming aware of previously unrecognized aspects of one's psychological and behavioral challenges is one of the central mechanisms of positive psychotherapeutic change. Yet the specific neurocognitive processes that underlie new realizations remain poorly understood. What must occur in one's mind and brain for awareness to emerge? Here, we present a novel, detailed, process-based framework for understanding how new awareness arises during psychotherapeutic dialogue. Central to this framework are the concepts of "mental navigation" and "cognitive map expansion," which we explain at both the conceptual and neuroscientific levels. Namely, individuals construct internal world models in the form of cognitive maps. Mental-health difficulties may reflect maps that are overly rigid or narrow. Therapeutic change may thus involve expanding these maps by mentally navigating beyond their current boundaries and forming new trajectories in the conceptual and neural activity space. We conclude by exploring clinical-practice implications as well as offering directions for empirically validating this model.
This article synthesizes how we think about groups and how we behave during interpersonal situations by integrating the influential stereotype content model from social psychology and the interpersonal perspective in per...This article synthesizes how we think about groups and how we behave during interpersonal situations by integrating the influential stereotype content model from social psychology and the interpersonal perspective in personality and clinical psychology. The empirically derived structural model of the interpersonal circumplex closely resembles the stereotype content model in its general form and specific dimensions. Integration allows researchers to hypothesize and test precise mechanisms linking stereotypes and interpersonal interactions using the common metaconcepts of agency and communion to link cognitions (stereotypes) and behavior. The interpersonal perspective has also been studied extensively, and repeated patterns of interaction have been linked to mental and physical health. Thus, this integration also has the potential to inform our mechanistic understanding of associations between stereotypes and outcomes and thus inform interventions intended to reduce stereotyping and its harmful effects. Integration with the stereotype content model also extends the interpersonal perspective by highlighting the importance of stereotypes as a repetitive influence on interpersonal interactions, similar to interpersonal conceptualizations of personality. This integration of the stereotype content model and the interpersonal tradition helps create a holistic view of the influence of stereotypes during interpersonal situations and explain why benefits or risks may follow.
The gender gap in creative achievement, wherein women are underrepresented as high-achieving creators across domains, has far-reaching consequences for individuals and society. Current explanations of what leads to gende...The gender gap in creative achievement, wherein women are underrepresented as high-achieving creators across domains, has far-reaching consequences for individuals and society. Current explanations of what leads to gender discrepancies in creative achievement, despite minimal differences between men and women in creative potential and ability, are incomplete. One vital factor in this process may be gender bias in the attributions of creativity given that both men and women have been found to attribute greater creativity to men. However, the antecedents and consequences of gender bias in attributions of creativity, as well as the processes by which bias impacts gender differences in creative achievement, remain unclear. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting a model describing how the social environment shapes gender bias in attributions of creativity, how bias influences gender differences in internal and external factors related to creativity, and how these factors interact to impact gender differences in creative behavior and achievement. The proposed model promotes a dynamic, multilevel understanding of the gender gap in creative achievement and provides a strong theoretical foundation for developing interventions to promote greater creative equity.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 Nov · PMID 40743457
·
Full text
The development of generative artificial intelligence capable of sustaining complex conversations has created a burgeoning market for companion chatbots promising social and emotional connection. The appeal of these prod...The development of generative artificial intelligence capable of sustaining complex conversations has created a burgeoning market for companion chatbots promising social and emotional connection. The appeal of these products raises questions about whether chatbots can fulfill the functions of close relationships. Proponents argue that relationships with chatbots can be as meaningful as relationships between humans, whereas critics argue they are a dangerous distraction from genuine connections. This analysis applies theoretical tools from more than 50 years of research on close relationships to evaluate the extent to which human-chatbot interactions meet the definition of and fulfill the functions of close relationships. Interactions between humans and chatbots do possess some characteristic features of close relationships: Humans and chatbots can influence each other and engage in frequent and diverse conversations over time. Chatbots can be responsive in ways humans perceive as supportive, generating feelings of connection and opportunities for growth. Yet because chatbots make only superficial requests of their users, relationships with them cannot provide the benefits of negotiating with and sacrificing for a partner and may reinforce undesirable behaviors. Research that attends to the characteristics of users, chatbots, and their interactions will be crucial for identifying for whom these relationships will be beneficial or harmful.
Emotions play a prominent role in personality psychology, yet personality researchers most frequently study them as broad dimensions (e.g., negative affect) rather than distinct emotions (e.g., fear). We argue that a gre...Emotions play a prominent role in personality psychology, yet personality researchers most frequently study them as broad dimensions (e.g., negative affect) rather than distinct emotions (e.g., fear). We argue that a greater incorporation of distinct emotions into personality research would enrich our understanding of personality. We highlight four ways in which personality research can be expanded by considering distinct emotions as inputs driving personality processes, mediators and moderators of relationships between personality factors and life outcomes, and outputs of personality processes. We then discuss how a personality-based methodological approach might enhance distinct emotions research and highlight an area in which the integration of distinct emotions has already benefited personality science. We conclude by reviewing methodological tools that personality researchers can use to measure distinct emotions empirically.
Cognitive dysfunction is essential to conceptualizing, defining, and assessing much of psychopathology. Despite this prominence, cognitive abilities are not included in the prevailing empirically based classification sys...Cognitive dysfunction is essential to conceptualizing, defining, and assessing much of psychopathology. Despite this prominence, cognitive abilities are not included in the prevailing empirically based classification system: the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP). This gap exists because the factor-analytic literature the HiTOP is based on has solely used reporter measures rather than neuropsychological tests needed to measure cognitive ability. Given HiTOP's influence on research and clinical practice, the omission of cognitive functions from the model is consequential. This study aimed to determine how cognitive abilities fit into the empirical structure of psychopathology with a meta-analytic joint factor analysis. We pooled data from three published meta-analyses into a single correlation matrix of eight disorders from the and seven cognitive functions. We then fit a series of models to the meta-analytic correlation matrix using exploratory factor analysis and correlated factors across levels to estimate the hierarchical structure. The highest level of the model included a general factor with strong loadings of all disorders and cognitive functions (median λ = |.51|, range = |.30| to |.64|). At the lowest level were three superspectra: psychosis and cognitive dysfunction, externalizing, and emotional dysfunction. Our results show cognitive abilities can be integrated into the HiTOP model and point to actionable next steps in research to accomplish this goal.
Meta-analyses have consistently demonstrated the robustness of the cross-race effect (CRE; i.e., better recognition of same-race faces compared with different-race faces). These analyses have unveiled variations in the d...Meta-analyses have consistently demonstrated the robustness of the cross-race effect (CRE; i.e., better recognition of same-race faces compared with different-race faces). These analyses have unveiled variations in the dependent variables associated with the CRE across combinations of participant and target races. However, the underlying factors driving these variations remain poorly understood. We posit that although the CRE is robust, its generalizability may be contingent on the specific racial groups compared, particularly when contrasting majority and minority racial groups. In this article, we delve into the dynamics of the CRE across distinct racial groups and explore how minority-race status may influence research outcomes. We considered the articles included in the latest meta-analyses of the CRE with a spotlight on minority-race status. We suggest that minority-race status may explain why many studies considering non-White participants do not show a CRE. The CRE might not be as robust as it appears to be because much of the research on the effect has focused on majority-race participants and minority-race faces. Going forward, researchers should consider incorporating measures relevant to the minority effect, fully crossing participant and target races and studying a greater variety of races.
Barrett LF, Atzil S, Bliss-Moreau E
… +13 more, Chanes L, Gendron M, Hoemann K, Katsumi Y, Kleckner IR, Lindquist KA, Quigley KS, Satpute AB, Sennesh E, Shaffer C, Theriault JE, Tugade M, Westlin C
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 May · PMID 40357691
·
Full text
A recently published article by van Heijst et al. attempted to reconcile two research approaches in the science of emotion-basic emotion theory and the theory of constructed emotion-by suggesting that the former explains...A recently published article by van Heijst et al. attempted to reconcile two research approaches in the science of emotion-basic emotion theory and the theory of constructed emotion-by suggesting that the former explains as bioregulatory states of the body whereas the latter explains that arise from those state changes. This bifurcation of emotion into objective physical states and subjective feelings involves three misleading simplifications that fundamentally misrepresent the theory of constructed emotion and prevent progress in the science of emotion. In this article we identify these misleading simplifications and the resulting factual errors, empirical oversights, and evolutionary oversimplifications. We then discuss why such errors will continue to arise until scientists realize that the two theories are intrinsically irreconcilable. They rest on incommensurate assumptions and require different methods of evaluation. Only by directly considering these differences will these research silos in the science of emotion finally dissolve, speeding the accumulation of trustworthy scientific knowledge about emotion that is usable in the real world.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 Nov · PMID 40068209
·
Full text
Basic emotion theories (BETs) and the theory of constructed emotion (TCE) have both made significant contributions to the field of affective science despite a persistent divide between the two camps. We argue that focusi...Basic emotion theories (BETs) and the theory of constructed emotion (TCE) have both made significant contributions to the field of affective science despite a persistent divide between the two camps. We argue that focusing on which camp is right hampers possibly fruitful collaborations between affective researchers working within different theoretical frameworks. The TCE and BETs can complement each other because they focus on different features of and questions about affective processes. Clearly defining and operationalizing these questions is crucial to further elucidating the evolutionary basis of emotion and feeling.
Sundh J, Millroth P, Collsiöö A
… +1 more, Juslin P
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 May · PMID 40035538
·
Full text
In psychological research, noise is often considered a nuisance that obscures rather than contributes information. This simplification overlooks that noise can be informative and that by exploring the nature of the noise...In psychological research, noise is often considered a nuisance that obscures rather than contributes information. This simplification overlooks that noise can be informative and that by exploring the nature of the noise one can often draw additional conclusions concerning the underlying psychological processes. It is arguably only in recent years that the mainstream of researchers has taken this idea to heart and demonstrated that it can lead to breakthroughs in the understanding of human behavior. The aim of this special section is to showcase some of the ways in which systematic exploration of noise can be achieved and how it can enrich psychological research. In this introductory article, we introduce the idea of treating noise as endogenous as opposed to exogenous to the theoretical and statistical models of psychological phenomena. We then contribute a historical review of the role of noise in psychological research, including discussions of previous endogenous treatments of noise in the literature. As an illustration, we describe our own research on the precise/not precise model and show how noise distributions can be used to delineate analytic and intuitive modes of reasoning. Finally, we briefly introduce the other contributions to this special section.
Seitz FI, Jarecki JB, Rieskamp J
… +1 more, von Helversen B
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 May · PMID 40035528
·
Full text
People often categorize the same object variably over time. Such intraindividual behavioral variability is difficult to identify because it can be confused with a bias and can originate in different categorization steps....People often categorize the same object variably over time. Such intraindividual behavioral variability is difficult to identify because it can be confused with a bias and can originate in different categorization steps. The current work discusses possible sources of behavioral variability in categorization, focusing on perceptual and cognitive processes, and reports a simulation with a similarity-based categorization model to disentangle these sources. The simulation showed that noise during perceptual or cognitive processes led to considerable misestimations of a response determinism parameter. Category responses could not identify the source of the behavioral variability because different forms of noise led to similar response patterns. However, continuous model predictions could identify the noise: Noisy feature perception led to variable predictions for central stimuli on the category boundary, noisy feature attention increased the prediction variability for stimuli differing from each category on another feature, and noisy similarity computation increased the variability for stimuli with moderate predictions. Measuring category beliefs in a continuous way (e.g., through category probability judgments) may therefore help to disentangle perceptual and process-related sources of behavioral variability. Ultimately, this can inform interventions aimed at improving human categorizations (e.g., diagnosis training) by indicating which steps of the categorization mechanism to target.
Sanborn AN, Zhu JQ, Spicer J
… +6 more, León-Villagrá P, Castillo L, Falbén JK, Li YX, Tee A, Chater N
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2025 May · PMID 40035520
·
Full text
Noise in behavior is often considered a nuisance: Although the mind aims for the best possible action, it is let down by unreliability in the sensory and response systems. Researchers often represent noise as additive, G...Noise in behavior is often considered a nuisance: Although the mind aims for the best possible action, it is let down by unreliability in the sensory and response systems. Researchers often represent noise as additive, Gaussian, and independent. Yet a careful look at behavioral noise reveals a rich structure that defies easy explanation. First, in both perceptual and preferential judgments sensory and response noise may potentially play only minor roles, with most noise arising in the cognitive computations. Second, the functional form of the noise is both non-Gaussian and nonindependent, with the distribution of noise being better characterized as heavy-tailed and as having substantial long-range autocorrelations. It is possible that this structure results from brains that are, for some reason, bedeviled by a fundamental design flaw, albeit one with intriguingly distinctive characteristics. Alternatively, noise might not be a bug but a feature. Specifically, we propose that the brain approximates probabilistic inference with a local sampling algorithm, one using randomness to drive its exploration of alternative hypotheses. Reframing cognition in this way explains the rich structure of noise and leads to the surprising conclusion that noise is not a symptom of cognitive malfunction but plays a central role in underpinning human intelligence.