It is commonly held that in vivo biological experimental models are concrete and non-fictional. This belief is primarily supported by the fact that in vivo studies involve biological models which are alive, and what is a...It is commonly held that in vivo biological experimental models are concrete and non-fictional. This belief is primarily supported by the fact that in vivo studies involve biological models which are alive, and what is alive cannot be fictional. However, I argue that this is not always the case. The design of an experimental model could still render an in vivo model fictional because fictional elements and processes can be built into these in vivo experimental models. These fictional elements are essential parts of a credentialed fiction because the designs of in vivo experimental models are constrained by imaginability, conceivability, and credit-worthiness. Therefore, despite its fictionality, it is credible for an in vivo experimental model to stand in for the phenomenon of interest.
The notion of "progress" can be defined as a directional change towards the better, implying both a descriptive and an axiological element. "Organic progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of life, whereas...The notion of "progress" can be defined as a directional change towards the better, implying both a descriptive and an axiological element. "Organic progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of life, whereas "technological progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of technological artifacts. This paper aims to disentangle conceptual questions about the notion of organic progress with respect to evolutionary theory, by proposing an epistemological perspective that also accounts for technological progress. My argument is set out in four sections. In section 2, drawing on the thought of some eminent evolutionary biologists, I will pinpoint a theoretical claim according to which a specific notion of organic progress is consistent with evolutionary theory. In section 3, I show some limits and problems that arise in the application of this theoretical claim to the organic domain. In section 4, I consider why these problems with application are often underestimated: I hypothesize that this is linked to the analogy frequently made between organic and technological progress. Finally, in section 5, I will carry on the analysis of this analogy by proposing a distinction between two levels of axiology. I claim that this distinction avoids several common confusions when talking about progress.
The article argues for the possibility of researchers' historical responsibility vis-à-vis ethnic groups. Such responsibility for a discipline's past transgressions is often attributed to anthropology, human genetics, pa...The article argues for the possibility of researchers' historical responsibility vis-à-vis ethnic groups. Such responsibility for a discipline's past transgressions is often attributed to anthropology, human genetics, parts of archaeology, and medicine, but without a clear conception of the nature of a responsibility supposedly going beyond the individual's own actions. Two concretizations are presented in order to show the fruitfulness and challenges of what I shall call a continuity approach: first, the case of the reburial of Sami human remains in Neiden, Norway; second, the use of the race concept in ethical and scientific contexts following the so-called New Synthesis in biology, which according to many marks a break with a racist past. Since no theory of researchers' historical responsibility towards ethnic groups exists, two partly relevant theories are brought in to provide a basis: Jenna Thompson's theory of nation states' responsibilities for past transgressions against peoples and a stance in political theory arguing that the beneficiary should pay even in cases where the beneficiary was not to blame for the original transgression. On this basis I sketch a continuity theory of historical responsibility, without which a notion of historical responsibility would be inapplicable in most actual cases.
Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and...Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local decisions.
I consider the motives of historians devising counterfactual histories, analyze the narrative structure of these histories, and assess their merits. Richard Evans attacked counterfactual histories as motivated by wishful...I consider the motives of historians devising counterfactual histories, analyze the narrative structure of these histories, and assess their merits. Richard Evans attacked counterfactual histories as motivated by wishful thinking. And he claimed that they could not contribute anything to the understanding of the past because they are concerned "with pointing out supposedly preferable alternatives." Both claims can be refuted with two particular counterfactual histories of biology. An analysis of the narrative structure of counterfactual histories suggests objective criteria that can distinguish those that have been designed, in order to reach a certain narrative ending, from those that were open-ended at the beginning. These criteria are then applied to two examples from the history of biology: Bowler's Darwin Deleted and Radick's 'Other Histories, Other Biologies.' Radick did not determine his counterfactual in advance, to meet a certain narrative ending. This refutes the first claim (wishful thinking). Bowler self-avowedly did design his counterfactual in advance, but its narrative ending still contributes to understanding. In particular, it shows that the idea of natural selection is not necessarily associated with its social discontents. This refutes the second claim (cannot contribute to understanding).
This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a "relaxed" (non-essentialist) notion of natural...This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a "relaxed" (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two accounts are examined, one by Rachel Cooper (2005; 2013) and one based on the work of Richard Boyd (1991; 1999; 2003; 2010). While these accounts do not directly pursue such a goal, the main aim is to probe whether deploying a "relaxed" notion of natural kind would be able to neutralize the criticism. While the conclusion is in the negative, the analysis raises doubts that it is possible to completely neutralize this criticism without assuming an overly simplistic view of the causal structure of the world.
This paper addresses the role of time scales in conceptualizing biological hierarchies. So far, the concept of hierarchies in philosophy of science has been dominated by the idea of composition and parthood, respectively...This paper addresses the role of time scales in conceptualizing biological hierarchies. So far, the concept of hierarchies in philosophy of science has been dominated by the idea of composition and parthood, respectively. However, this view does not exhaust the diversity of hierarchical descriptions in the biosciences. Therefore, we highlight a type of hierarchy usually overlooked by philosophers of science. It distinguishes processes based on the different time scales (i.e. rates, frequencies, and rhythms) on which they occur. These time scale hierarchies often are connected with assumptions defended in process ontology. Due to their ability to describe interlevel dynamics of various kinds, we call these hierarchies 'dynamic hierarchies.' In order to highlight and discuss their organization, explanatory roles, and epistemic virtues we focus on dynamic hierarchies in developmental biology and evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo). In these fields, dynamic hierarchies offer crucial complementary information to descriptions of compositional hierarchies.
This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part o...This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part of the human genome. I address this question by analyzing how biologists in fact partition the human genome into parts. This paper thus presents a case study in the metaphysics of biological practice. I develop a metaphysical account of genomic parthood by analyzing the investigative and reasoning practices in the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project. My account reveals two conditions that determine whether a molecule is a part of the human genome (i.e., a genomic part). First, genomic parts must possess a causal role function in the genome as a whole, that is, their functions must contribute to the genome directing the overall functioning of the cell. Second, genomic parts must have a specific chemical structure and be actual segments of the DNA sequence of the genome.
DNA sequencing has been characterised by scholars and life scientists as an example of 'big', 'fast' and 'automated' science in biology. This paper argues, however, that these characterisations are a product of a particu...DNA sequencing has been characterised by scholars and life scientists as an example of 'big', 'fast' and 'automated' science in biology. This paper argues, however, that these characterisations are a product of a particular interpretation of what sequencing is, what I call 'thin sequencing'. The 'thin sequencing' perspective focuses on the determination of the order of bases in a particular stretch of DNA. Based upon my research on the pig genome mapping and sequencing projects, I provide an alternative 'thick sequencing' perspective, which also includes a number of practices that enable the sequence to travel across and be used in wider communities. If we take sequencing in the thin manner to be an event demarcated by the determination of sequences in automated sequencing machines and computers, this has consequences for the historical analysis of sequencing projects, as it focuses attention on those parts of the work of sequencing that are more centralised, fast (and accelerating) and automated. I argue instead that sequencing can be interpreted as a more open-ended process including activities such as the generation of a minimum tile path or annotation, and detail the historiographical and philosophical consequences of this move.
Mechanism diagrams exhibit visually the organized parts and operations of a biological mechanism. A mechanism diagram can facilitate mechanistic research by providing a mechanistic explanation of the phenomenon of intere...Mechanism diagrams exhibit visually the organized parts and operations of a biological mechanism. A mechanism diagram can facilitate mechanistic research by providing a mechanistic explanation of the phenomenon of interest. Much research has been focusing on the mechanistic explanation and the explanatory mechanistic models. As a specific type of scientific diagram, a simple mechanism diagram can be explanatory by drawing on the rich explanatory resources of non-depicted background knowledge. The relationship between the visually depicted and the background knowledge is underexplored. It is unclear how the non-depicted background knowledge of a mechanism diagram contributes to providing a better-informed explanation of the phenomenon of interest in biological sciences. With the aim to explore this relationship, I articulate that a mechanism diagram provides a mechanistic explanation by a process called abstraction-by-aggregation. Through visual cues, the unified relevant background knowledge provides an epistemic access to a better-informed explanation.
The goal of this paper is to analyze a little-known set of documents referring to a "Dancing Epidemic" that took place in Itapagipe, a suburb of Salvador, capital of the province of Bahia, Brazil, in 1882. Through the st...The goal of this paper is to analyze a little-known set of documents referring to a "Dancing Epidemic" that took place in Itapagipe, a suburb of Salvador, capital of the province of Bahia, Brazil, in 1882. Through the studies of a group of physicians, especially Raimundo Nina Rodrigues (1862-1906), a psychiatrist and anthropologist from the Bahia School of Medicine, the medical knowledge built on this unique phenomenon in Brazilian history is examined. The case in particular involved a crowd that spread through the streets of Itapagipe, attracting the interest of the medical classes, who were intrigued by the symptoms of motor incoordination the patients manifested. Inspired by foreign literature, but developing their own theories, Rodrigues and colleagues created a unique body of knowledge about the infirmity.
Kant's views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts...Kant's views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant's views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of Kant's views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant's position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant's views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition.
Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neith...Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view. I show (among other things) that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being (partially) constituted by the object(s) seen.
Most historians of science and medicine agree that medical interest in genetics intensified after 1930, and interest in the relationship of radiation damage and genetics continued and expanded after World War II. Moreove...Most historians of science and medicine agree that medical interest in genetics intensified after 1930, and interest in the relationship of radiation damage and genetics continued and expanded after World War II. Moreover, they maintain that the synthesis and convergence of human genetics and cytological techniques in European centers resulted in their dissemination to centers in the United States, resulting in a new field of expertise focused on medicine and clinical research, known as cytogenetics. In this article, we broaden the scope of the inquiry by showing how the early histories of cytogenetics in Canada and Mexico unfolded against strikingly different backgrounds in clinical research and the delivery of health care. We thus argue that the field of cytogenetics did not emerge in a straightforward manner and develop in the same way in all countries. The article provides a brief background to the history of human cytogenetics, and then outlines key developments related to the early adoption of cytogenetics in Canada and Mexico. Conclusions are then drawn using comparisons of the different ways in which local determinants affected adoption. We then propose directions for future study focused on the ways in which circuits of practices, collaborative research, and transfers of knowledge have shaped how cytogenetics has come to be organised in medicine around the world.
This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in suppo...This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology's research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology's adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology's attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology's adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one.
In some quarters within philosophy of medicine, more particularly in the phenomenological approaches, naturalism is looked upon with suspicion. This paper argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish between two ex...In some quarters within philosophy of medicine, more particularly in the phenomenological approaches, naturalism is looked upon with suspicion. This paper argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish between two expressions of this attitude towards naturalism: phenomenological approaches to illness disagree with naturalism regarding various theoretical claims and they disapprove of naturalism on an ethical level. Second, this paper argues that both the disagreement with and the disapproval of naturalism are to a large extent confused. It then offers some proposals to set up an agenda for future collaboration.
This paper argues that Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) constitutes a biopolitical problem, a scientific object which needs to be studied, classified and regulated. Assemblages of authorities,...This paper argues that Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) constitutes a biopolitical problem, a scientific object which needs to be studied, classified and regulated. Assemblages of authorities, knowledges and techniques make CFS/ME subjects and shape their everyday conduct in an attempt to increase their supposed autonomy, wellbeing and health. CFS and CFS/ME identities are however made not only through government, scientific, and medical interventions but also by the patients themselves, a biosocial community who collaborates with scientists, educates itself about the intricacies of biomedicine, and contests psychiatric truth claims. CFS/ME is an illness trapped between medicine and psychology, an illness that is open to debate and therefore difficult to manage and standardise. The paper delineates different interventions by medicine, science, the state and the patients themselves and concludes that CFS/ME remains elusive, only partially standardised, in an on-going battle between all the different actors that want to define it for their own situated interests.
This paper evaluates the application of evidentiary standards originating from evidence-based medicine in nutrition advice. It shows that it is problematic to criticize nutrition recommendations for not being based on ra...This paper evaluates the application of evidentiary standards originating from evidence-based medicine in nutrition advice. It shows that it is problematic to criticize nutrition recommendations for not being based on randomized controlled trials. Due to practical, ethical and methodological and reasons, it is difficult to conduct rigorous randomized controlled trials for acquiring evidence that is relevant for achieving the goals of population-level nutrition recommendations. Given the non-epistemic goals of the dietary recommendations, criteria of acceptable evidence should be adapted to the goals of the practice and the practical, ethical, and methodological constraints of the situation.