It is widely believed that the function of the heart is obviously to pump blood. I argue here that it is not. The definition, presentation, and pathophysiological explanation of heart failure, as well as the measurement...It is widely believed that the function of the heart is obviously to pump blood. I argue here that it is not. The definition, presentation, and pathophysiological explanation of heart failure, as well as the measurement of cardiac dysfunction, are not as might be expected if the function of the heart was simply to pump blood. Far from being obvious, many central features of heart failure are still being investigated. This has important implications for philosophical debates about health and disease. According to naturalists like Christopher Boorse, medical practice is founded on a well-established body of physiological knowledge, which provides the one true account of the biological function of organs. On this naturalistic view, there should only be one account of the pathophysiology of heart failure in use in medical practice. This account of the pathophysiology of heart failure should be well-established, as opposed to uncertain. Medics should use this physiological knowledge to inform their clinical practice, and not vice versa. Clinical considerations, such as whether patients respond to therapy, should not inform debates about what the pathophysiology of heart failure is. I will show this is not the case. The handling of knowledge of the biological function of the heart in medical practice differs substantially from Boorse's account.
Some philosophers of medicine argue that there are objective facts about the biological function of organs, and that these facts are used to objectively define diseases. The function of the heart is taken to be particula...Some philosophers of medicine argue that there are objective facts about the biological function of organs, and that these facts are used to objectively define diseases. The function of the heart is taken to be particularly obvious and well established. Contrary to this, I argue that the function of the heart is not fixed by nature, but rather that it is historically contingent. The disease heart failure results from the dysfunction of the heart. In opposition to the common-sense intuitions of philosophers, medics do not define heart failure simply as a reduced cardiac output, and up to half of patients with heart failure have a normal cardiac output. The present day medical definition of heart failure is thus counter-intuitive. In the early twentieth century, however, medics did define heart failure as a reduced cardiac output. This view was opposed in the 1930s, when a similar definition of heart failure to the one used today was put forward. I look closely at this historical episode, in order to explore the reasons for this development. I use this history to argue that present day knowledge of heart failure is not the inevitable result of careful observation of patients, but rather is historically contingent.
Recently there has been a practice turn in the philosophy of science that has called for analyses to be grounded in the actual doings of everyday science. This paper is in furtherance of this call and it does so by emplo...Recently there has been a practice turn in the philosophy of science that has called for analyses to be grounded in the actual doings of everyday science. This paper is in furtherance of this call and it does so by employing participant-observation ethnographic methods as a tool for discovering epistemological features of scientific practice in a neuroscience lab. The case I present focuses on a group of neurobiologists researching the genetic underpinnings of cognition in Down syndrome (DS) and how they have developed a new mouse model which they argue should be regarded as the "gold standard" for all DS mouse research. Through use of ethnographic methods, interviews, and analyses of publications, I uncover how the lab constructed their new mouse model. Additionally, I describe how model organisms can serve as abstract standards for scientific work that impact the epistemic value of scientific claims, regulate practice, and constrain future work.
The concept of 'levels of organization' has come under fire recently as being useless for scientific and philosophical purposes. In this paper, we show that 'levels' is actually a remarkably resilient and constructive co...The concept of 'levels of organization' has come under fire recently as being useless for scientific and philosophical purposes. In this paper, we show that 'levels' is actually a remarkably resilient and constructive conceptual tool that can be, and in fact is, used for a variety of purposes. To this effect, we articulate an account of the importance of the levels concept seen in light of its status as a major organizing concept of biology. We argue that the usefulness of 'levels' is best seen in the heuristic contributions the concept makes to treating and structuring scientific problems. We illustrate this with two examples from biological research.
Many have argued that there is no reason why natural selection should cause directional increases in measures such as body size or complexity across evolutionary history as a whole. In this paper I argue that this conclu...Many have argued that there is no reason why natural selection should cause directional increases in measures such as body size or complexity across evolutionary history as a whole. In this paper I argue that this conclusion does not hold for selection for adaptations to environmental variability, and that, given the inevitability of environmental variability, trends in adaptations to variability are an expected feature of evolution by natural selection. As a concrete instance of this causal structure, I outline how this may be applied to a trend in phenotypic plasticity.
If a temporal rather than spatial concept of waste is adopted, novel categories emerge which are useful for identifying and understanding logics of temporality at play in determining what is kept in contemporary brain ba...If a temporal rather than spatial concept of waste is adopted, novel categories emerge which are useful for identifying and understanding logics of temporality at play in determining what is kept in contemporary brain banks, and reveal that brain banks are constituted by more than stored materials. First, I apply the categories analytically on a recent UK brain banking discussion among professionals. This analysis highlights the importance of data in brain banks, as well as the centrality of ideas about pasts and futures in the discussions. Secondly, I investigate the case of a seven decades old, Danish brain bank which had been reduced to its physically stored material for 24 years, before being reinstituted in 2006. This case demonstrates the importance of material and conceptual infrastructures that co-constitute a collection, as they make up an experimental system that is crucial to maintaining the collection's continued relevance and usefulness as a scientific institution.
Infectious diseases are often said to have a universal etiology, while chronic and noncommunicable diseases are said to be multifactorial in their etiology. It has been argued that the universal etiology of an infectious...Infectious diseases are often said to have a universal etiology, while chronic and noncommunicable diseases are said to be multifactorial in their etiology. It has been argued that the universal etiology of an infectious disease results from its classification using a monocausal disease model. In this article, I will reconstruct the monocausal model and argue that modern 'multifactorial diseases' are not monocausal by definition. 'Multifactorial diseases' are instead defined according to a constitutive disease model. On closer analysis, infectious diseases are also defined using the constitutive model rather than the monocausal model. As a result, our classification models alone cannot explain why infectious diseases have a universal etiology while chronic and noncommunicable diseases lack one. The explanation is instead provided by the Nineteenth Century germ theorists.
This paper discusses the "non-reception" of Darwin's works and concepts in French palaeontology and palaeoanthropology between 1859 and 1914. Indeed, this integration was difficult, biased and belated, for ideological, i...This paper discusses the "non-reception" of Darwin's works and concepts in French palaeontology and palaeoanthropology between 1859 and 1914. Indeed, this integration was difficult, biased and belated, for ideological, intellectual and epistemological reasons: Clémence Royer's biased 1862 translation of Darwin's Origin of Species pulled its ideas toward "social darwinism", making them less attractive to the natural sciences. - French nationalism and the authority of religion, which imposed Cuvier's thinking until late into the century - the dominance of Lamarckian and neo-Lamarckian transformism in France, both in biology and in paleontology, which proposed the notion of orthogenetic laws and environmental determinations, and refused darwinian evolutionary mechanisms - obstacles inherent to the application of Darwin's concepts to palaeontology, namely the impossibility to identify evolutionary mechanisms through the fossil record, which was stressed by Darwin himself and underlined in turn by 19th century French palaeontologists. However, as I argue, in the course of the examined period, French palaeontology grew from refusal to a better understanding and evaluation of Darwin's thinking. The quest for intermediary forms, the construction of branching evolutionary trees and the attempts to reconstruct human biological and cultural evolution were important efforts toward an integration of some aspects of Darwinian views and practices into French palaeontology and plaeoanthropology. The 1947 Paris conference which brought together American Neo-darwinists and French paleontologists made Darwinian concepts better understood and triggered a revival of French palaeontology from the 1960s.
Over the last six decades there has been a consistent trend in the philosophy literature to emphasize the role of causes in scientific explanation. The emphasis on causes even pervades discussions of non-causal explanati...Over the last six decades there has been a consistent trend in the philosophy literature to emphasize the role of causes in scientific explanation. The emphasis on causes even pervades discussions of non-causal explanations. For example, the concern of a recent paper by Marc Lange (2013b) is whether purported cases of statistical explanation are "really statistical" or really causal. Likewise, Michael Strevens (2011) argues that the main task of statistical idealizations is to distinguish between the causal factors that make a difference to the phenomenon to be explained and those that do not. But, the philosophy literature poorly reflects the history of the development of statistical explanation in the sciences. Francis Galton's (19th century) explanation for the laws of heredity is our case. Galton's statistical explanation was both innovative for his time and influential to our contemporary sciences. The key points to understanding Galton's statistical explanation for reversion is that it is autonomous from the real-world biological properties that make up an instance of reversion while still being approximately true of many real-world biological phenomena. Ours is an expanded discussion of ideas originated in Hacking (1990) and Sober (1980). We will articulate these features and compare our account with that of Lange and Strevens.
This paper presents the impact of diverse aspects of Darwin's works on the practices of mammal paleontology in different moments of nineteenth-century Argentina. Starting with Darwin through the publications of Florentin...This paper presents the impact of diverse aspects of Darwin's works on the practices of mammal paleontology in different moments of nineteenth-century Argentina. Starting with Darwin through the publications of Florentino Ameghino, it shows the extraordinary complexity of systematic paleontology that characterized the second half of the nineteenth century. Neither "natural selection" nor "struggle for life" seemed to have shaped the practices of vertebrate paleontology in Argentina. Darwin's earlier work as a voyageur and geologist together with later concerns about intermediate forms and variation allow for an assessment of the impact of Darwin's work on the practice of paleontology in Argentina.
The concept of epigenetics has evolved since Waddington defined it from the late 1930s as the study of the causal mechanisms at work in development. It has become a multi-faceted notion with different meanings, depending...The concept of epigenetics has evolved since Waddington defined it from the late 1930s as the study of the causal mechanisms at work in development. It has become a multi-faceted notion with different meanings, depending on the disciplinary context it is used. In this article, we first analyse the transformations of the concept of epigenetics, from Waddington to contemporary accounts, in order to identify its different meanings and traditions, and to come up with a typology of epigenetics throughout its history. Second, we show on this basis that epigenetics has progressively turned its main focus from biological problems regarding development, toward issues concerning evolution. Yet, both these different epistemological aspects of epigenetics still coexist. Third, we claim that the classical opposition between epigenesis and preformationism as ways of thinking about the developmental process is part of the history of epigenetics and has contributed to its current various meanings. With these objectives in mind, we first show how Waddington introduced the term "epigenetics" in a biological context in order to solve a developmental problem, and we then build on this by presenting Nanney's, Riggs' and Holliday's definitions, which form the basis for the current conception of "molecular epigenetics". Then, we show that the evo-devo research field is where some particular uses of epigenetics have started shifting from developmental issues to evolutionary problems. We also show that epigenetics has progressively focused on the issue of epigenetic inheritance within the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis' framework. Finally, we conclude by presenting a typology of the different conceptions of epigenetics throughout time, and analyse the connections between them. We argue that, since Waddington, epigenetics, as an integrative research area, has been used to bridge the gap between different biological fields.
This paper considers what evidence is needed to establish the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy. The claim that A cures D is a particular case of a causal claim in medicine. So the paper begins with a general an...This paper considers what evidence is needed to establish the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy. The claim that A cures D is a particular case of a causal claim in medicine. So the paper begins with a general analysis of the evidence for causal claims in medicine. Such evidence is divided into two types: statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. These are further divided into observational and interventional, producing a 2x2 classification. It is shown that historically there have different assessments of the importance of these different types of evidence. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) puts forward the thesis that claims of the form 'A cures D without harming the patient' can be established using only randomized controlled trials or RCTs. This thesis of EBM is criticized by considering two historical examples: streptomycin and thalidomide. Generalizing from these, it is claimed that the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy can only be established by using both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. This is a specific instance of the Russo-Williamson thesis.
This paper investigates German-speaking paleontologists' reception of Darwin's thought and the ways in which they negotiated their space of knowledge production accordingly. In German-speaking regions, the majority of pa...This paper investigates German-speaking paleontologists' reception of Darwin's thought and the ways in which they negotiated their space of knowledge production accordingly. In German-speaking regions, the majority of paleontologists welcomed Darwin's magnum opus, since it granted paleontology an independent voice within biology, and thus a new institutional setting. However, in the process of negotiating the features of paleontology within the Darwinian framework, German paleontologists constrained their practices too narrowly, for fear of leaving open possible results at odds with the burgeoning Darwinian biological community. In doing so, they also limited the further development of German paleontology. In other words, paleontologists Karl Alfred von Zittel (1839-1904) and Melchior Neumayr (1845-1890) advocated for a handmaid's role for paleontology, which increased biologists' dependence on paleontologists for empirical evidence, but which limited paleontologists' theoretical autonomy. By analyzing both the institutional strategies and the methodology of German-speaking paleontology at the end of the nineteenth century, this paper shows the importance of scientists' ability to enter into and negotiate their place within the broader biological community.
The paper examines the social, cultural and disciplinary factors that influenced the reception and appropriation of Darwinism by China's first generation paleontologists. Darwinism was mixed with Social Darwinism when fi...The paper examines the social, cultural and disciplinary factors that influenced the reception and appropriation of Darwinism by China's first generation paleontologists. Darwinism was mixed with Social Darwinism when first introduced to China, and the co-option of Darwinian phrases for nationalistic awakening obscured the scientific essence of Darwin's evolutionary theory. First generation Chinese paleontologists started their training in 1910s-1920s. They quickly asserted their professional identity by successfully focusing on morphology, taxonomy and biostratigraphy. Surrounded by Western paleontologists with Lamarckian or orthogenetic leanings, early Chinese paleontologists enthusiastically embraced evolution and used fossils as factual evidence; yet not enough attention was given to mechanistic evolutionary studies. The 1940s saw the beginning of a new trend for early Chinese paleontologists to incorporate more biological and biogeographical components in their work, but external events such as the dominance of Lysenkoism in the 1950s made the Modern Synthesis pass by without being publicly noticed in Chinese paleontology. Characterized by the larger goal of using science for nation building and by the utilitarian approach favoring local sciences, the reception and appropriation of Darwinism by first generation Chinese paleontologists raise important questions for studying the indigenizing efforts of early Chinese scientists to appropriate Western scientific theories.
This paper examines the tension between Darwinian evolution and palaeontological research in Britain in the 1860-1914 period, looking at how three key promoters of Darwinian thinking - Thomas Henry Huxley, Edwin Ray Lank...This paper examines the tension between Darwinian evolution and palaeontological research in Britain in the 1860-1914 period, looking at how three key promoters of Darwinian thinking - Thomas Henry Huxley, Edwin Ray Lankester and Alfred Russell Wallace - integrated palaeontological ideas and narratives of life's history into their public presentations of evolutionary theory. It shows how engagement with palaeontological science was an important part of the promotion of evolutionary ideas in Britain, which often bolstered notions that evolution depended upon progress and development along a wider plan. While often critical of some of the non-Darwinian concepts of evolution professed by many contemporary palaeontologists, and frequently citing the 'imperfection' of the fossil record itself, Darwinian thinkers nevertheless engaged extensively with palaeontology to develop evolutionary narratives informed by notions of improvement and progress within the natural world.
Despite the vast literature on Darwinism and race, the way in which Darwin's opinions on race were received and used by non-Western circles has been little studied. In the case of the Turks, Darwin's comments have been r...Despite the vast literature on Darwinism and race, the way in which Darwin's opinions on race were received and used by non-Western circles has been little studied. In the case of the Turks, Darwin's comments have been related to British-Ottoman relations, and Darwin was blamed for stoking anti-Turkish sentiment within Europe. This allegedly resulted in the British occupation of Egypt in the 19th century, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, as well as contemporary Neo-Nazi arson attacks in Germany which targeted Turkish migrants. Consequently, Turkish anti-Darwinists perceive Darwinism to be not merely a false scientific theory, but also a political-ideological instrument of Western hegemony wielded against Turkey and the Islamic World. Turkish Darwinists who responded to those claims, on the other hand, presented Darwin as an egalitarian who could overcome the prejudices of his social class. Further scrutiny, however, proves both accounts to be over-simplistic. This paper aims to throw some light on the context within which Darwin expressed his opinions on Turks and thus contribute to the broader discussion of the relationship between Darwinism and race. More importantly, it aims to familiarise Western readers with one of the cultures of creationism which is very little known, despite its great impact on Muslim masses.
The logical empiricists expressed a consistent attitude to racial categorisation in both the ethical and scientific spheres. Their attitude may be captured in the following slogan: human racial taxonomy is an empirically...The logical empiricists expressed a consistent attitude to racial categorisation in both the ethical and scientific spheres. Their attitude may be captured in the following slogan: human racial taxonomy is an empirically meaningful mode of classifying persons that we should refrain from deploying. I offer an interpretation of their position that would render coherent their remarks on race with positions they adopted on the scientific status of taxonomy in general, together with their potential moral or political motivations for adopting that position.