The legitimacy of functional explanations in biology is threatened by a problem first identified by Hempel: the problem of functional equivalence. In order for the prevalence of a trait to be explained by its function, t...The legitimacy of functional explanations in biology is threatened by a problem first identified by Hempel: the problem of functional equivalence. In order for the prevalence of a trait to be explained by its function, the function would have to explain why that very trait is prevalent and not some other functionally equivalent trait. But functions alone cannot meet this explanatory demand. I argue that this is a problem not only for Nagelian deductive-nomological models but also for etiological models of functional explanation. I contrast these models with a dual model of adaptive explanation and design explanation. This dual model largely circumvents the problem of functional equivalence, but divests functions of much explanatory power.
This paper identifies a common political struggle behind debates on the validity and permissibility of animal experimentation, through an analysis of two recent European case studies: the Italian implementation of the Eu...This paper identifies a common political struggle behind debates on the validity and permissibility of animal experimentation, through an analysis of two recent European case studies: the Italian implementation of the European Directive 2010/63/EC regulating the use of animals in science, and the recent European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) 'Stop Vivisection'. Drawing from a historical parallel with Victorian antivivisectionism, we highlight important threads in our case studies that mark the often neglected specificities of debates on animal experimentation. From the representation of the sadistic scientist in the XIX century, to his/her claimed capture by vested interests and evasion of public scrutiny in the contemporary cases, we show that animals are not simply the focus of the debate, but also a privileged locus at which much broader issues are being raised about science, its authority, accountability and potential misalignment with public interest. By highlighting this common socio-political conflict underlying public controversies around animal experimentation, our work prompts the exploration of modes of authority and argumentation that, in establishing the usefulness of animals in science, avoid reenacting the traditional divide between epistemic and political fora.
In this paper I sketch William Whewell's attempts to impose order on classificatory mineralogy, which was in Whewell's day (1794-1866) a confused science of uncertain prospects. Whewell argued that progress was impeded b...In this paper I sketch William Whewell's attempts to impose order on classificatory mineralogy, which was in Whewell's day (1794-1866) a confused science of uncertain prospects. Whewell argued that progress was impeded by the crude reductionist assumption that all macroproperties of crystals could be straightforwardly explained by reference to the crystals' chemical constituents. By comparison with biological classification, Whewell proposed methodological reforms that he claimed would lead to a natural classification of minerals, which in turn would support advances in causal understanding of the properties of minerals. Whewell's comparison to successful biological classification is particularly striking given that classificatory biologists did not share an understanding of the causal structure underlying the natural classification of life (the common descent with modification of all organisms). Whewell's key proposed methodological reform is consideration of multiple, distinct principles of classification. The most powerful evidence in support of a natural classificatory claim is the consilience of claims arrived at through distinct lines of reasoning, rooted in distinct conceptual approaches to the target objects. Mineralogists must consider not only elemental composition and chemical affinities, but also symmetry and polarity. Geometrical properties are central to what makes an individual mineral the type of mineral that it is. In Whewell's view, function and organization jointly define life, and so are the keys to understanding what makes an organism the type of organism that it is. I explain the relationship between Whewell's teleological account of life and his natural theology. I conclude with brief comments about the importance of Whewell's classificatory theory for the further development of his philosophy of science and in particular his account of consilience.
A historical episode of evolutionary theory, which has lead to the Red Queen theory of the evolutionary maintenance of sex, includes two striking contingencies. These are used to explore alternative what-if scenarios, in...A historical episode of evolutionary theory, which has lead to the Red Queen theory of the evolutionary maintenance of sex, includes two striking contingencies. These are used to explore alternative what-if scenarios, in order to test some common opinions about such counterfactuals. This sheds new light on the nature of science and its historiography. One counterfactual leads to an unexpected convergence of its result to that of the actual science but, nevertheless, differs in its causal structure. The other diverges towards an incompatible alternative, but this requires further contingent choices that also diverge from actual science. The convergence in the first counterfactual is due to a horizontal transfer of knowledge. Similar transfers of knowledge are typical for innovations of actual science. This suggests that contingent choices can merge as well as fork research traditions both in actual research and counterfactual history. Neither the paths of the actual history of science nor those of its counterfactual alternatives will form a tree of exclusively diverging bifurcations, but a network instead. Convergencies in counterfactuals may, therefore, be due to the web-structure of science as much as to the aims of the historians in question. Furthermore, the difference in causal structure between the actual science and its convergent counterfactual might become diagnostic for external factors rather than internal aims forcing a historian towards convergence.
William D. Hamilton's name is often connected to important theoretical accomplishments, from the theory of inclusive fitness and kin selection to the so-called Hamilton's rule and the haplodiploidy hypothesis. This artic...William D. Hamilton's name is often connected to important theoretical accomplishments, from the theory of inclusive fitness and kin selection to the so-called Hamilton's rule and the haplodiploidy hypothesis. This article asks: How did Hamilton attempt to test his theory and hypothesis against the complexity of the biological world? The article reconstructs Hamilton's empirical work with social wasps between 1963 and 1968, the years before and after the publication of the groundbreaking "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior" in 1964. It points out the centrality of Hamilton's work on wasps and shows how the British scientist attempted to test theories and hypotheses with naturalistic, developmental, and physiological observations as well as, at times, with experimental manipulations. The article offers a new perspective on the history of the scientific understanding of the evolution of social behavior. In contrast to existing narratives, this perspective emphasizes the importance of empirical work-e.g. natural history, physiology, comparative anatomy-which is often obscured by a nearly exclusive focus on theoretical developments in this field.
This essay was written almost ten years ago when the urgency of America's failure as a nation to respond to the threats of climate change first came to preoccupy me. Although the essay was never published in full, I circ...This essay was written almost ten years ago when the urgency of America's failure as a nation to respond to the threats of climate change first came to preoccupy me. Although the essay was never published in full, I circulated it informally in an attempt to provoke a more public engagement among my colleagues in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. In particular, it was written in almost direct response to Philip Kitcher's own book, Science, Truth and Democracy (2001), in an attempt to clarify what was special about Climate Science in its relation to truth and democracy. Kitcher's response was immensely encouraging, and it led to an extended dialogue that resulted, first, in a course we co-taught at Columbia University, and later, to the book The Seasons Alter: How to Save Our Planet in Six Acts (W. W. Norton) published this spring. The book was finished just after the Paris Climate Accord, and it reflects the relative optimism of that moment. Unfortunately events since have begun to evoke, once again, the darker mood of this essay. I am grateful to Greg Radick for suggesting its publication.
This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience-brain reward function-to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called 'Heuristic Identity Theory' (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating...This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience-brain reward function-to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called 'Heuristic Identity Theory' (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci
· 2017 Aug · PMID 28511068
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The approval, from 1986, of a series of recombinant hepatitis B vaccines was a landmark both in the growth of biotechnology and in the development of the vaccine innovation system. In this paper, we show how the early de...The approval, from 1986, of a series of recombinant hepatitis B vaccines was a landmark both in the growth of biotechnology and in the development of the vaccine innovation system. In this paper, we show how the early development of the hepatitis B vaccines was shaped by a political and economic context that newly favoured commercialisation of academic research, including the appropriation and management of intellectual property; we elucidate the contingent interests and motivations that led new biotechnology companies and established pharmaceutical businesses to invest in developing recombinant vaccines specifically against hepatitis B; and we show how these and other factors combined to make those vaccines an unexpected commercial success. Broadening the scope of our analysis to include not just North America and Europe but also low- and middle-income countries, we show how the development of the hepatitis B vaccines facilitated the emergence of a two-tier innovation system structured by tensions between the demands for commercial profitability on the one hand, and the expectation of public health benefit for low- and middle-income countries on the other.
We examine recent work in cognitive neuroscience that investigates brain networks. Brain networks are characterized by the ways in which brain regions are functionally and anatomically connected to one another. Cognitive...We examine recent work in cognitive neuroscience that investigates brain networks. Brain networks are characterized by the ways in which brain regions are functionally and anatomically connected to one another. Cognitive neuroscientists use various noninvasive techniques (e.g., fMRI) to investigate these networks. They represent them formally as graphs. And they use various graph theoretic techniques to analyze them further. We distinguish between knowledge of the graph theoretic structure of such networks (structural knowledge) and knowledge of what instantiates that structure (nonstructural knowledge). And we argue that this work provides structural knowledge of brain networks. We explore the significance of this conclusion for the scientific realism debate. We argue that our conclusion should not be understood as an instance of a global structural realist claim regarding the structure of the unobservable part of the world, but instead, as a local structural realist attitude towards brain networks in particular. And we argue that various local approaches to the realism debate, i.e., approaches that restrict realist commitments to particular theories and/or entities, are problematic insofar as they don't allow for the possibility of such a local structural realist attitude.
About 540 million years ago, a rapid radiation of animal phyla radically changed the Earth's biota in a geological eye-blink. What caused this "Cambrian explosion"? Over the years, paleontologists have pointed to a wide...About 540 million years ago, a rapid radiation of animal phyla radically changed the Earth's biota in a geological eye-blink. What caused this "Cambrian explosion"? Over the years, paleontologists have pointed to a wide array of different physical mechanisms as the causal "trigger" for the explosion. More recently, some paleontologists have proposed complex causal pathways to which multiple physical mechanisms are said to have contributed. Despite their variety, these answers share an assumption that a single explanation can in principle be constructed that identifies some factor or confluence of factors as the cause of the Cambrian explosion. That assumption is unjustifiable. The Cambrian explosion had multiple causes, and different aspects of the event are best explained by different causes. These different causes cannot, even in principle, be integrated into a single causal explanation. We can learn much about the causes of the Cambrian explosion-or for that matter about any historical event-but only by attending more carefully to how we frame our causal questions about the past.
In his book What is Life? Erwin Schrödinger coined the term 'code-script', thought by some to be the first published suggestion of a hereditary code and perhaps a forerunner of the genetic code. The etymology of 'code' s...In his book What is Life? Erwin Schrödinger coined the term 'code-script', thought by some to be the first published suggestion of a hereditary code and perhaps a forerunner of the genetic code. The etymology of 'code' suggests three meanings relevant to 'code-script which we distinguish as 'cipher-code', 'word-code' and 'rule-code'. Cipher-codes and word-codes entail translation of one set of characters into another. The genetic code comprises not one but two cipher-codes: the first is the DNA 'base-pairing cipher'; the second is the 'nucleotide-amino-acid cipher', which involves the translation of DNA base sequences into amino-acid sequences. We suggest that Schrödinger's code-script is a form of 'rule-code', a set of rules that, like the 'highway code' or 'penal code', requires no translation of a message. Schrödinger first relates his code-script to chromosomal genes made of protein. Ignorant of its properties, however, he later abandons 'protein' and adopts in its place a hypothetical, isomeric 'aperiodic solid' whose atoms he imagines rearranged in countless different conformations, which together are responsible for the patterns of ontogenetic development. In an attempt to explain the large number of combinations required, Schrödinger referred to the Morse code (a cipher) but in doing so unwittingly misled readers into believing that he intended a cipher-code resembling the genetic code. We argue that the modern equivalent of Schrödinger's code-script is a rule-code of organismal development based largely on the synthesis, folding, properties and interactions of numerous proteins, each performing a specific task.
Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how res...Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how researchers crafted the graphics for scientific publication in the field of circadian biology. The case highlights social aspects of graphical production which have gone understudied - especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I argue that it also supports a challenge to the claim that empirically-informed "cognitive design principles" offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern good scientific graphic design to communicate data and hypotheses to other experts. In this respect, the case-study also illustrates how "descriptive" studies of scientific practice can connect with normative issues in philosophy of science, thereby addressing a central concern in recent discussions of practice-oriented philosophy of science.
Communication among cells (also known as cross-talk) plays a prominent role in the current knowledge of the pathophysiology of cancer and of cancer-associated conditions such as paraneoplastic syndromes and cachexia that...Communication among cells (also known as cross-talk) plays a prominent role in the current knowledge of the pathophysiology of cancer and of cancer-associated conditions such as paraneoplastic syndromes and cachexia that are responsible for much of cancer's morbidity and mortality. Yet, biomedical scientists lack an explicit unifying frame that places this exchange of molecular information at the core of their understanding of cancer as a systemic disease. Propaganda is a type of information that aims at misleading, a form of communication intended primarily to serve the messenger. The biased molecular cross-talk between cancer and non-cancer cells can be considered as a form of biological propaganda. I here propose cancer is a propagandist as a metaphor that may serve as a unifying frame to interpret both cancer and cancer-associated syndromes under the same communication-based concept and may thus serve to bring together research that is currently compartmentalized under separate disciplines.
Wild types in genetics are specialised strains of laboratory experimental organism which principally serve as standards against which variation is measured. As selectively inbred lineages highly isolated from ancestral w...Wild types in genetics are specialised strains of laboratory experimental organism which principally serve as standards against which variation is measured. As selectively inbred lineages highly isolated from ancestral wild populations, there appears to be little wild or typical about them. I will nonetheless argue that they have historically been successfully used as stand-ins for nature, allowing knowledge produced in the laboratory to be extrapolated to the natural world. In this paper, I will explore the 19th century origins of the wild type concept, the theoretical and experimental innovations which allowed concepts and organisms to move from wild nature to laboratory domestication c. 1900 (resulting in the production of standardised lab strains), and the conflict among early geneticists between interactionist and atomist accounts of wild type, which would eventually lead to the conceptual disintegration of wild types and the triumph of genocentrism and population genetics. I conclude by discussing how the strategy of using wild type strains to represent nature in the lab has nonetheless survived the downfall of the wild type concept and continues to provide, significant limitations acknowledged, an epistemically productive means of investigating heredity and evolutionary variation.
In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions. Mark Sagoff offers a formal reply. In it, he concede...In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions. Mark Sagoff offers a formal reply. In it, he concedes that I succeeded in establishing that ecologists abandoned robust teleological views long ago and that they use teleological characterizations as metaphors that aid in developing mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena. Yet, he contends that I did not give enduring criticisms of theoretical ecology a fair shake in my paper. He says this is because enduring criticisms center on concerns about the nature of ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality of ecological laws and theoretical models, and the relation between theoretical and empirical methods in ecology that that paper does not broach. Below I set apart the distinct criticisms Sagoff presents in his commentary and respond to each in turn.
From the perspective of the new mechanistic philosophy, it has been argued that explanatory causal mechanisms in some special sciences such as biochemistry and neurobiology cannot be captured by any useful notion of theo...From the perspective of the new mechanistic philosophy, it has been argued that explanatory causal mechanisms in some special sciences such as biochemistry and neurobiology cannot be captured by any useful notion of theory, or at least by any standard notion. The goal of this paper is to show that a model-theoretic notion of theory, and in particular the structuralist notion of a theory-net already applied to other unified explanatory theories, adequately suits the MWC allosteric mechanism explanatory set-up. We also argue, contra some mechanistic claims questioning the use of laws in biological explanations, that the theory reconstructed in this way essentially contains non-accidental regularities that qualify as laws, and that taking into account these lawful components, it is possible to explicate the unified character of the theory. Finally, we argue that, contrary to what some mechanists also claim, functional explanations that do not fully specify the mechanistic structure are not defective or incomplete in any relevant sense, and that functional components are perfectly explanatory. The conclusion is that, as some authors have emphasized in other fields (Walmsley 2008), particular elements of traditional approaches do not contradict but rather complement the new mechanist philosophy, and taken together they may offer a more complete understanding of special sciences and the variety of explanations they provide.
Stephen Jay Gould's views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist program in evolutionary theory. In this paper I cast a critical eye over those views. I focus on three central aspects of Go...Stephen Jay Gould's views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist program in evolutionary theory. In this paper I cast a critical eye over those views. I focus on three central aspects of Gould's views on species: the relation between the Darwinian and the metaphysical notions of individuality, the relation between the ontology of species and macroevolution, and the issue of contextualism and conventionalism about the metaphysics of species.