Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jun · PMID 42378103
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For many years, research on attention has been dominated by theories based on the assumption that attention is limited in capacity. These include the limited-capacity-channel theories of Welford and Broadbent and capacit...For many years, research on attention has been dominated by theories based on the assumption that attention is limited in capacity. These include the limited-capacity-channel theories of Welford and Broadbent and capacity or resource theories by Moray, Posner, and Kahneman. This article challenges these theories and their many descendants by asking why capacity is limited and what role capacity plays in the computations required to perform attention tasks. There are few satisfactory answers in limited-capacity and resource theories of attention. I show that the effects of load on performance, which are commonly interpreted as evidence for limited capacity, can be produced by models that assume unlimited, limited, and fixed capacity. I argue that attention is better construed as a selection of information that we need to achieve our goals. Following current research on computational models of attention in associative learning, categorization, perceptual learning, cognitive development, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, I propose that attention is a process of choice in which selection is implemented as multiplicative gain control and processing is constrained by normalization. This perspective focuses on interactions between representations and decision processes applied to them, explaining many attentional phenomena without assuming attention is a limited resource.
Why do people punish wrongdoers when they are not personally affected? Researchers on costly third-party punishment have long debated whether such behavior reflects strategic self-interest or a moral commitment to fairne...Why do people punish wrongdoers when they are not personally affected? Researchers on costly third-party punishment have long debated whether such behavior reflects strategic self-interest or a moral commitment to fairness and justice. Recent developmental evidence offers important insights into this question. We argue that the origins of costly third-party punishment in early childhood are best explained by nonstrategic moral concerns. Young children selectively punish norm violators, incur personal costs to do so, and intervene even when they stand to gain nothing-often without reputational incentives or expectations of future benefit. Empirical studies indicate that children's punishment is driven by egalitarian norms, retributive motives, and efforts to alleviate victims' distress. In contrast, strategic motivations, such as reputation management and self-protection, appear only later in development. These findings challenge the view that third-party punishment is grounded in self-interest and instead support the idea that a concern for justice underlies the earliest forms of human norm enforcement. We conclude that whereas strategic considerations may shape punishment in adolescence and adulthood, they build upon an early-emerging moral foundation centered on fairness and justice.
Traditional developmental science has often described child growth as a sequence of stages or linear progressions, yet many phenomena-abrupt spurts and regressions, idiosyncratic pathways, and widening individual differe...Traditional developmental science has often described child growth as a sequence of stages or linear progressions, yet many phenomena-abrupt spurts and regressions, idiosyncratic pathways, and widening individual differences-resist linear accounts. This article proposes as a framework for quantifying developmental trajectories. Chaos theory, which addresses how complex patterns emerge from simple rules in deterministic yet unpredictable ways, aligns with observations of sensitive developmental periods, emergent behaviors, and divergent outcomes. I situate chaos theory alongside dynamic systems theory, neuroconstructivism, and developmental-cascade models and clarify how chaos might add mathematical precision to established insights: Bifurcation analysis identifies tipping points at which behaviors reorganize; Lyapunov exponents quantify stability and sensitivity to small perturbations; state-space methods reconstruct attractor landscapes from dense time series; and complexity metrics discriminate structured variability from noise. These tools convert powerful metaphors-soft assembly, attractors, cascades-into testable hypotheses about when and why qualitative change occurs. Such a framework also motivates microgenetic and high-density longitudinal designs, computational modeling of phase transitions, and interventions conceived as targeted perturbations delivered near sensitive windows. Finally, I discuss why adopting a chaos framework can be advantageous compared with (or in concert with) traditional linear models.
Memory research has evolved along two distinct traditions: well-controlled laboratory experiments emphasizing precision and tractability and naturalistic-memory experiments emphasizing generalization to real-world contex...Memory research has evolved along two distinct traditions: well-controlled laboratory experiments emphasizing precision and tractability and naturalistic-memory experiments emphasizing generalization to real-world contexts. Although both have yielded important insights, we do not yet have a generalized theory of memory consistently interpreted across laboratory and naturalistic paradigms. By analyzing the strengths and limitations of the two traditions, I propose that formal modeling is the key to creating this theoretical link. A formal theory, instantiated in precise computational models that are developed over decades of laboratory-based experiments, needs naturalistic experiments to test its generalizability and reveal its limitations. Naturalistic experiments, in turn, better connect with existing laboratory paradigms when their results are explained by the same theoretical model. To achieve this, I propose a step-by-step procedure in which naturalistic settings are considered as all possible scenarios that could be realized in the real world, with laboratory settings forming a smaller subset that we have understood well. Our goal as memory researchers is to incrementally expand the scope of existing laboratory studies, theories, and models to account for increasingly naturalistic scenarios, ultimately achieving a generalized theory of memory. Together, the proposed framework no longer views laboratory versus naturalistic approaches as a trade-off to navigate, given their different priorities and methodologies, but considers them both essential in working toward the same goal.
Thanks to our remarkable ability to transmit technical content, our technologies have become more sophisticated. Intuitively, one might assume that this evolution has imposed greater demands on the technical brain. Howev...Thanks to our remarkable ability to transmit technical content, our technologies have become more sophisticated. Intuitively, one might assume that this evolution has imposed greater demands on the technical brain. However, recent neuroscientific research suggests that this evolution has also increasingly engaged the social brain to address the opacity it has generated in making, transactive, and use processes. Here, we build on these findings to design a neurocognitive framework that outlines the role of the social brain in (a) facilitating the transmission of making processes, (b) relying on human experts as extensions of our technical cognition, and (c) engaging with certain technologies-including machines-as if they were intentional biological agents. The framework emphasizes the dynamic interplay between the technical and social brain and explores the mechanisms that drive switching between these networks in response to technological opacity, including bottom-up perceptual cues and causal uncertainty. It also considers how expertise modulates network engagement and guides the allocation of cognitive resources. Overall, this framework provides a unified perspective on how humans navigate complex technological environments, illustrating the coevolution of technical and social cognition and the adaptive strategies that allow us to interact with technologies that we cannot fully understand.
Teaching phonics-that is, systematic mappings between letters and sounds-plays a foundational role in how children learn to read in alphabetical writing systems. Although the reading sciences yield important insights int...Teaching phonics-that is, systematic mappings between letters and sounds-plays a foundational role in how children learn to read in alphabetical writing systems. Although the reading sciences yield important insights into the factors underlying effective phonics instruction, these findings have not been sufficiently linked to key decisions that teachers must make in the classroom-for instance, which spelling-sound regularities to teach, in what order to introduce them, how to illustrate them with example words, and when to teach exception words. We first show that existing phonics programs provide varying guidance on these aspects, which may affect learning outcomes in ways that are poorly understood. We then discuss how research on reading and learning can inform key considerations regarding the use of effective phonics content. We also highlight gaps in current knowledge that remain to be addressed by further work. Finally, we outline a road map for how future research could support the design and selection of optimized phonics content, thus benefiting the professional practice of diverse stakeholders in education.
The self-voice plays a fundamental role in communication and identity yet remains a relatively neglected topic in psychological science. As AI-generated and digitally manipulated voices become more common, understanding...The self-voice plays a fundamental role in communication and identity yet remains a relatively neglected topic in psychological science. As AI-generated and digitally manipulated voices become more common, understanding how individuals perceive and process their own voice is increasingly important. Disruptions in self-voice processing are implicated in several clinical conditions, including psychosis, autism, and personality disorders, highlighting the need for integrative models to explain the self-voice across contexts. However, research faces two major challenges: a methodological one (i.e., replicating the bone-conducted acoustics that shape natural self-voice perception) and a conceptual one (i.e., a persistent bias toward treating the self-voice as purely auditory). To address these gaps, we propose a framework that decomposes the self-voice into five interacting components: auditory, motor control, memory, multisensory integration, and self-concept. We review the functional and neural basis of each component and suggest how they converge within distributed brain networks to support coherent self-voice processing. This integrative framework aims to advance theoretical and translational work by bridging psychology, neuroscience, clinical research, and voice technology in the context of emerging digital voice environments.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jul · PMID 41805594
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Cognitive psychologists have long been interested in the intersection of emotion and memory, given that the emotions associated with a stimulus affect its memorability. Theoretical perspectives within cognitive science h...Cognitive psychologists have long been interested in the intersection of emotion and memory, given that the emotions associated with a stimulus affect its memorability. Theoretical perspectives within cognitive science have guided research on how affective dimensions, such as valence and arousal, affect aspects of memory, such as accuracy, subjective vividness, consolidation, and retrieval. Here we argue that well-established theories of emotion from affective science represent a fruitful source of ideas whose implications for episodic memory have not yet been thoroughly investigated. In the current article, we propose a model of emotional memory, inspired by psychological-constructionist theories of emotion, that builds upon existing perspectives in this area while generating several novel hypotheses and avenues of investigation. Following psychological constructionism, we conceive of emotions as emergent phenomena constructed when perceivers use conceptual knowledge to make sense of affective sensations in context. The (CMEM) highlights new directions for future emotional-memory research, such as investigating the mnemonic consequences of conceptual emotion knowledge and considering the effects of variability in emotion construction at the situational, individual, and cultural levels.
Comparisons in psychological research are often directional, with one entity (a group, situation, condition, or measurement) that is the "target" of the comparison being compared to a baseline or reference point (the "re...Comparisons in psychological research are often directional, with one entity (a group, situation, condition, or measurement) that is the "target" of the comparison being compared to a baseline or reference point (the "referent"). A particular unidirectional framing often gets entrenched in a research tradition. This can be problematic because people (including researchers) focus disproportionately on the target rather than on the referent of directional comparisons. They thus mainly seek explanations for differences or similarities in processes associated with the target. As a consequence, a unidirectional perspective obscures ideas and impedes theoretical progress, particularly if the designation of the referent was arbitrary (i.e., not representing a default) to begin with. We first examine mechanisms that entail unidirectionality in research traditions. Drawing primarily on social psychology (but with an eye toward the broader field of psychology), we review examples in which a dominant unidirectional perspective has been fruitfully challenged. We then present four case studies from domains characterized by unidirectionality in which reversing the direction of comparison could stimulate new insights. We provide guidelines for avoiding or reversing one-way theoretical paths and consider metaquestions that our analysis provokes. We end with limitations of our work and recommendations for future research.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jul · PMID 41790931
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People increasingly live their lives online, which means that their identities are increasingly constituted by and displayed through their activities on digital platforms. Existing theorizing about the psychology of digi...People increasingly live their lives online, which means that their identities are increasingly constituted by and displayed through their activities on digital platforms. Existing theorizing about the psychology of digital identity has emphasized the social roles that people perceive and aim to verify online. These accounts can explain how digital identities are shaped by the social environment but not how they come together to create social life online. Moreover, there are unique features of digital identities, imposed by the digital platforms on which they are enacted, that cannot be accounted for by existing theories of offline social identity. To address these limitations, in the current article we propose a that outlines how a person's digital identity is shaped by their online and offline group memberships, as well as the implications of this psychological process for the well-being and performance of both individuals and groups. In outlining this theory, we aim to extend theorizing around social identity and digital identity by integrating these fields within a framework that recognizes and helps us better understand the merging of online and offline life.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Jul · PMID 41785327
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Recently, claims have emerged that artificial intelligence (AI) is better at providing empathy than humans. These claims are based on experiments in which large language models were prompted to generate empathic response...Recently, claims have emerged that artificial intelligence (AI) is better at providing empathy than humans. These claims are based on experiments in which large language models were prompted to generate empathic responses to short emotional passages. These responses, as well as analogous responses generated by human participants, were judged by third-party human raters. In several cases, the AI-generated responses were preferred to human responses. Such findings have led to suggestions that people should use empathic AI to supplement human empathy. This article critically examines these positions by drawing analogies to two well-established psychological effects. First, I argue that the apparent preferability of AI-generated empathy reflects an analogue of the "wisdom-of-the-crowd" effect. This reframes the performance of empathic AI in a more mundane and less dehumanizing way. Second, I consider whether people should use AI for empathy. Here I draw an analogy to placebo effects, suggesting that even clear utilitarian benefits may not justify the adoption of empathic AI. Through these analogies between AI and well-known psychological effects, this article equips readers with new conceptual tools for grappling with empathic AI, its performance, and the morality of its use.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 May · PMID 41747223
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Nuclear weapon threats are increasing and may be comparable to levels not seen since the worst periods of the Cold War. There could be value in psychologists documenting and explaining people's responses to nuclear weapo...Nuclear weapon threats are increasing and may be comparable to levels not seen since the worst periods of the Cold War. There could be value in psychologists documenting and explaining people's responses to nuclear weapons. More than 3 decades have passed since the last major reviews of people's responses to nuclear weapons. We thus aimed to understand how psychologists and researchers from related fields have empirically studied responses to nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. We systematically mapped articles reporting on people's responses. A search in Web of Science and Scopus identified 18,505 hits. Screening resulted in 256 suitable articles. We assessed (a) publication patterns, including how many articles focused on responses to nuclear weapons, when those articles were published, and in which field; (b) the research community, namely author collaborations and focal journals; (c) research themes, as indicated by cocitation networks and theoretical backgrounds; and (d) the validity, generalizability, and replicability of empirical findings, as indicated by adequate samples and validated measures. We found renewed interest in the field but not yet a coherent research community and only some evidence for its evolution from occasional, scattered, one-off studies toward a coherent and coordinated scholarly field.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 May · PMID 41666131
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The sense of presence is typically defined as the feeling of "being there" in a virtual environment, whereas the sense of reality is defined as the ability to discriminate between real and unreal phenomena. We challenge...The sense of presence is typically defined as the feeling of "being there" in a virtual environment, whereas the sense of reality is defined as the ability to discriminate between real and unreal phenomena. We challenge this rigid dichotomy, arguing that presence and reality can be considered conceptually, mechanistically, and phenomenologically continuous. We first demonstrate that both cognitive sciences and virtual reality (VR) studies use the terms inconsistently and interchangeably. We then go on to identify and combine perceptual and cognitivist accounts of presence, arguing that presence, like reality, is likely to be formed from integrative mechanisms. We then go further to identify converging psychophysical findings from the two fields in multisensory integration, self-embodiment, and agency. This is further supported by results from preliminary neuroimaging studies, indicating a shared frontolimbic substrate for generating the feeling of "realness." This reconceptualization has significant implications, including validating the use of VR as a tool for studying the sense of reality and its clinical disorders. We conclude by advocating for directly comparing these phenomena in future research to systematically test for their functional and neural equivalence.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 May · PMID 41666116
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The "socioeconomic achievement gap" refers to socioeconomic disparities in children's academic outcomes. Do these gaps invariably reflect cognitive processes that are similar in kind across the socioeconomic status (SES)...The "socioeconomic achievement gap" refers to socioeconomic disparities in children's academic outcomes. Do these gaps invariably reflect cognitive processes that are similar in kind across the socioeconomic status (SES) spectrum but differ quantitatively in their efficacy? Or, in some cases, do they reflect cognitive processes that differ, in kind, between higher and lower SES, that is, qualitatively? In this systematic review, we used the ways in which brain structure and function relate to cognitive performance to answer these questions, focusing on academically relevant cognitive abilities. Specifically, the brain correlates of performance served as a signal regarding the underlying cognitive processes used to perform cognitive tasks. The literature was searched for studies that reported whether SES moderated the brain-cognition relation. In 15 cases, significant moderation was found, suggesting that children from diverse SES backgrounds may use underlying brain systems differently to achieve cognitive task performance. Three general mechanisms are reviewed, as are the broader implications of qualitative differences for teaching and for the causal relations leading to socioeconomic disparities in cognition.
Although academic departments and institutions frequently champion ideals of egalitarianism and inclusion, many are defined by status hierarchies that can undermine their stated commitment to these ideals. This article e...Although academic departments and institutions frequently champion ideals of egalitarianism and inclusion, many are defined by status hierarchies that can undermine their stated commitment to these ideals. This article examines the distinct and interconnected influences of power, privilege, and positionality in the defense of progressive norms, with a particular focus on psychology departments as a context for epistemic and cultural analysis. The article proposes three orienting principles to guide departments toward greater equity and inclusion: (a) triangulating policies, ideals, and norms through participatory equity; (b) fostering an inclusive climate that values diverse forms of knowledge; and (c) establishing the preconditions for sustainable culture change, including alignment of rewards, acknowledgment of resistance, the need for restorative sacrifice, and measurement of progress. Collectively, these principles offer a practical framework for reconfiguring the academic department toward cultural inclusivity and socially situated scholarship that is meaningfully aligned with the civic responsibilities of higher education.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 May · PMID 41615421
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In 1961, Donald Hebb established a classic paradigm for studying repetition learning: He asked participants to remember several memory sets for an immediate serial recall task and repeated one set multiple times througho...In 1961, Donald Hebb established a classic paradigm for studying repetition learning: He asked participants to remember several memory sets for an immediate serial recall task and repeated one set multiple times throughout the experiment. Participants' ability to recall the repeated set improved gradually with repetitions, thereby demonstrating repetition learning. Explaining this effect has concerned researchers for decades because it provides key insights into how we form durable memory representations through repeated exposure. In this article, we revisit the dominant views on the mechanisms underlying repetition learning, thereby challenging the central assumption that repetition learning is gradual and implicit. We show how these views have emerged from flawed analytical approaches, summarize recent evidence strongly contradicting these claims, and reanalyze previously published data to illustrate how correcting implausible analytical assumptions leads to different theoretical conclusions. We propose an updated theoretical framework of the cognitive mechanisms underlying repetition learning that integrates elements from previous models of the Hebb repetition effect with established models of episodic memory, thereby joining two branches of the memory literature.
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Mar · PMID 41608879
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As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly embedded in social life, understanding its interpersonal and psychological implications is urgent yet undertheorized. This article introduces the machine-integrated re...As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly embedded in social life, understanding its interpersonal and psychological implications is urgent yet undertheorized. This article introduces the machine-integrated relational adaptation (MIRA) model, a transdisciplinary, middle-range theoretical framework that provides a foundational account of when, how, and why AI functions as a relational entity in human ecosystems. MIRA distinguishes two crucial roles of AI: relational partner (direct-interaction companion) and relational mediator (shaping human-to-human communication). Synthesizing psychosocial theories of human relationships, interpersonal communication theory, psycholinguistics, and human-computer interaction, MIRA structures AI's relational impact within antecedents, processes, moderators, and outcomes. Central to MIRA are four principles describing how AI fosters social adaptation: linguistic reciprocity, psychological proximity, interpersonal trust, and relational substitution versus enhancement. These principles illuminate how adaptive AI language and behavior can elicit emotional investment, simulate mutual understanding, or even supplant human interaction. MIRA integrates established theories-attachment theory, social exchange theory, and epistemic trust frameworks-and proposes a research agenda that bridges foundational psychology with emerging sociotechnical contexts. Rather than offering a deterministic view, MIRA provides a generative, testable structure for investigating the evolving role of AI in relational life and guiding future human-AI-connection research.
In 2025, U.S. policy changes imposed sweeping limits on the scope of research eligible for federal support alongside sharp reductions to science-agency budgets, threatening the foundations of psychological science. This...In 2025, U.S. policy changes imposed sweeping limits on the scope of research eligible for federal support alongside sharp reductions to science-agency budgets, threatening the foundations of psychological science. This article examines the consequences of these shifts across three interrelated domains. First, topic-based restrictions curtail inquiry into key areas such as gender and sexual identity, social determinants of mental health, and systemic disparities, jeopardizing the continuation and expansion of research essential to evidence-based policy and interventions. Second, shrinking budgets and reduced funding opportunities destabilize graduate and postdoctoral training systems, constraining opportunities for emerging scholars and weakening the pipeline of future researchers. Third, cutbacks to health-agency budgets and programs diminish the delivery of mental-health services, with immediate and long-term consequences for public well-being. Although the analysis centers on the United States, the implications extend globally given the reach of U.S. investments, collaborations, and training infrastructure. The article concludes that although systemic challenges are formidable, psychologists at all career stages retain tools to resist their most harmful effects and to safeguard the field's scientific integrity and societal impact.
Van Lissa CJ, Peikert A, Ernst MS
… +3 more, van Dongen NNN, Schönbrodt FD, Brandmaier AM
Perspect Psychol Sci
· 2026 Mar · PMID 41570238
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Open science innovations have focused on rigorous theory testing, yet methods for specifying, sharing, and iteratively improving theories remain underdeveloped. To address this limitation, we introduce , a standard for s...Open science innovations have focused on rigorous theory testing, yet methods for specifying, sharing, and iteratively improving theories remain underdeveloped. To address this limitation, we introduce , a standard for specifying theories as findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable digital objects. FAIR theories are findable in well-established archives; accessible in terms of their availability and ability to be understood; interoperable for specific purposes, such as selecting control variables; and reusable in that they can be iteratively and collaboratively improved on. This article adapts the FAIR principles for theory; reflects on current FAIR practices in relation to psychological theory; and discusses FAIR theories' potential impact in terms of reducing research waste, enabling metaresearch on theories' structure and development, and incorporating theory into reproducible research workflows-from hypothesis generation to simulation studies. We present a conceptual workflow for FAIRifying theory that builds on existing open science principles and infrastructures. More detailed tutorials, worked examples, and convenience functions to automate this workflow are available in the R package. FAIR theory constitutes a structured protocol for archiving, communicating about, and iteratively improving theory, addressing a critical gap in open scholarly practices and potentially increasing the efficiency of cumulative knowledge acquisition in psychology and beyond.